


“WE HAVE TO TRY TO BREAK THE SILENCE SOMEHOW:”

Preventing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence through UN Peacekeeping

CENTER FOR
CIVILIANS IN CONFLICT
RECOGNIZE. PREVENT. PROTECT. AMEND.

RECOGNIZE. PREVENT. PROTECT. AMEND.

October 2020

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Cover: ***October 11, 2018.***
On the International Day of the Girl Child, female police officers serving with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), including Police Commissioner Unaisi Lutu Vuniwaqa, visit a school in Juba.

Credit: UNMISS/Eric Kanalstein

ORGANIZATIONAL MISSION AND VISION

Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) is an international organization dedicated to promoting the protection of civilians caught in conflict. CIVIC's mission is to work with armed actors and civilians in conflict to develop and implement solutions to prevent, mitigate, and respond to civilian harm. Our vision is a world where parties to armed conflict recognize the dignity and rights of civilians, prevent civilian harm, protect civilians caught in conflict, and amend harm.

CIVIC was established in 2003 by Marla Ruzicka, a young humanitarian who advocated on behalf of civilians affected by the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Building on her extraordinary legacy, CIVIC now operates in conflict zones throughout the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and South Asia to advance a higher standard of protection for civilians.

At CIVIC, we believe that parties to armed conflict have a responsibility to prevent and address civilian harm. To accomplish this, we assess the causes of civilian harm in particular conflicts, craft practical solutions to address that harm, and advocate for the adoption of new policies and practices that lead to the improved well-being of civilians caught in conflict. Recognizing the power of collaboration, we engage with civilians, governments, militaries, and international and regional institutions to identify and institutionalize strengthened protections for civilians in conflict.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS

CANs - Community Alert Networks

CAR - Central African Republic

CCIR - Commander's Critical Information Requirements

CPAS - Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System

CRSV - Conflict-related sexual violence

DDR - Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

DRC - Democratic Republic of the Congo

FETs - Female Engagement Teams

HRDDP - Human Rights Due Diligence Policy

IDP - Internally displaced person

IRs - Intelligence Requirements

ISPs - Information sharing protocols

JMAC - Joint Mission Analysis Center

JOC - Joint Operations Center

LPCs - Local Protection Committees

MARA - Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting Arrangements

MINUSCA - United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

MONUSCO - United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

NAS - National Salvation Front

NSAGs - Non-state armed groups

O-SRSG SVC - Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict

OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OIOS - United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services

PWG - Protection Working Group

SAGE - Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise

SEA - Sexual exploitation and abuse

SGBV - Sexual and gender-based violence

SLT - Senior Leadership Team

SMG-P - Senior Management Group on Protection

SSR - Security sector reform

UMIRR[1] **-** Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Eradication of Sexual Violence Against Women and Children

UNFPA - United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

UNICEF - United Nations Children's Fund

UNMISS - United Nations Mission in South Sudan

UNPOL - United Nations Police

UNSC - United Nations Security Council

UN DPPA - United Nations Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

UN ITS - United Nations Integrated Training Service

UN OCC - United Nations Operations and Crisis Center

UN OCHA - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UN OMA - United Nations Office of Military Affairs

WPAs - Women Protection Advisors

WPS - Women, peace, and security

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It has been twenty years since the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed its first thematic resolution on women, peace, and security—UNSC Resolution 1325. This resolution recognizes, among other concerns, the important role peacekeeping missions should play in protecting civilians from conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). Since Resolution 1325 was passed in the year 2000, the UNSC has passed nine additional thematic resolutions on women, peace, and security (WPS), and UN Secretariat bodies have drafted increasingly detailed guidance for peacekeepers on how to implement them. Beyond the Security Council, numerous UN Member States have made high-level political commitments to support the implementation of thematic WPS resolutions and address gender-related issues, including CRSV, through UN peacekeeping.[2]

Despite the growing attention to CRSV in Security Council resolutions, associated UN guidance, and UN Member State initiatives, the scale and brutality of CRSV in many of the countries where peacekeeping missions are deployed remains significant. Peacekeeping missions cannot assume that, because they are carrying out protection-related activities more generally, they are adequately or effectively protecting women, men, girls, and boys from sexual violence. Sexual violence can occur at different times and in different places than other types of violence. In South Sudan, for example, CRSV has often peaked days or weeks after other violent clashes have calmed. Currently, the implementation of a revitalized peace agreement in South Sudan heralds a potential pathway out of violence between major parties to a civil war. However, sexual violence continues to be perpetrated during intercommunal clashes, and the security arrangements outlined in the peace agreement itself raise new concerns. As the parties to the agreement redeploy their troops into cantonment camps near towns and villages, there is a risk of bringing potential perpetrators closer to vulnerable women, men, girls, and boys. The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where national security forces have been responsible for high levels of sexual violence, offers another example. Operations carried out by the national army against an armed non-state group may help reduce killings, rapes, and abductions of civilians committed by that group, but they could concurrently lead to an increase in sexual violence perpetrated by the national army.

Sexual violence is often less visible than other types of harm perpetrated against civilians—a dead body is easier to identify than a survivor of rape. Missions therefore need to be attuned to the potential for CRSV and make a concerted effort to identify CRSV risks and cases. This may require investing energy in ensuring missions are equally engaging women and men and, when appropriate, girls and boys, each of whom can have very different experiences of violence.

> ***Peacekeeping missions cannot assume that, because they are carrying out protection-related activities more generally, they are adequately or effectively protecting women, men, girls, and boys from sexual violence.***

Recognizing the need for peacekeepers to dedicate specialized attention to CRSV—as well as the challenges that this necessity poses for them—CIVIC undertook research to assess how the UN peacekeeping Missions in South Sudan

(UNMISS), the DRC (MONUSCO), and the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) are incorporating gender into their conflict analysis and how they are prioritizing efforts to protect civilians from CRSV.[3] To do so, we carried out hundreds of interviews with peacekeepers, humanitarian actors, civilians, civil society leaders, and other stakeholders across the three countries between 2018 and 2020.

Relying on UN guidance and on CIVIC's past research into conflict dynamics and peacekeeping operations, we identified core variables related to an effective approach to addressing CRSV. These variables include:

- whether missions are effectively and equitably engaging women and men in host nation communities where they are deployed;
- whether their information collection and reporting processes adequately incorporate CRSV and sex-disaggregated data;
- whether they sufficiently analyze trends in CRSV;
- whether gender-sensitive analysis and analysis of trends in CRSV are used as the basis for decision-making;
- the degree to which civilian and military leadership in missions support and prioritize response to CRSV threats; and
- whether responses to CRSV are appropriately integrated and coordinated across peacekeeping mission components and other UN entities.

Throughout the course of the research, we also identified examples of good practice in Mission responses to CRSV. These responses spanned a variety of thematic areas and included activities that fall under all three tiers of protection as defined in the UN Policy on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping: protection through dialogue and engagement; provision of physical protection; and creating a protective environment. Notably, in most areas that CIVIC examined, we found that UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA are making progress. All three Missions are more proactively engaging women in early warning forums, increasingly collecting sex-disaggregated data, and including information about CRSV in their information and reporting requirements. Information-sharing on CRSV among peacekeepers and between the Missions and UN protection agencies has been strengthened through reinvigorated monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements (MARAs), while incident tracking databases allow for better analysis on trends in CRSV and the gendered dynamics of violence. Specific examples of Mission responses to CRSV are also encouraging. For instance, UNMISS has engaged with armed actors to secure commitments against CRSV, as well as the release of over 100 women and girls abducted by armed groups in Western Equatoria. Likewise, MONUSCO implemented a comprehensive plan of action against CRSV by a faction of the Raia Mutomboki armed group in the Shabunda territory of South Kivu that coordinated activities across all three Mission components and led to a significant reduction in CRSV in the area.[4] All three Missions are providing mandated support on CRSV to national institutions and criminal justice chains to investigate and prosecute these violations.

Nonetheless, progress has been uneven across the three Missions, and many of the efforts to improve information collection, analysis, and response to CRSV are not yet systematic or institutionalized. Some strategic documents exist to provide staff with guidance on CRSV, but awareness of them needs to be improved in light of the regular rotation of uniformed personnel. Civilian and uniformed peacekeepers need additional training on gender-sensitive analysis and CRSV, but the capacity of gender and CRSV specialists in these Missions is already stretched thin.[5] In addition, the UN is not consistently recruiting or evaluating personnel in a way that brings broader expertise on gender into missions outside these specialist roles. The civilian leadership at the highest levels of UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA have demonstrated their commitment to addressing CRSV, but CIVIC's research indicates that commitment is less consistent among civilian leaders at the Missions' lower levels and among the leadership of military components. The regular rotation of Force Commanders and Sector Commanders exacerbates this inconsistency, causing rapid and significant shifts—for better or worse—in the prioritization of gender sensitivity in the activities and operations of military components.



October 23, 2017. *UN Police (UNPOL) officers from the United Nations Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) lead sensitization classes on sexual and gender-based violence at a school in Bangui.*

Prioritization of CRSV and consistent messaging by mission leadership on the importance of combatting CRSV are critical. But the heads of missions are often preoccupied with a range of other important tasks. In addition to prioritization by leadership, missions need accountability mechanisms to routinely track both the performance of individual personnel at different levels and the overall impact of peacekeeping operations on CRSV. The UN has established 15 core WPS indicators to track gender-mainstreaming, and missions are increasingly asked to report on their responses to CRSV.[6] UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA are now more regularly monitoring the gender sensitivity of Mission programming, and some of the indicators they are tracking have the potential to improve responses to CRSV. However, too much of the monitoring and reporting done by these Missions still focuses on process rather than impact; on gender equality and parity among peacekeeping personnel rather than substantive knowledge about CRSV; and on the participation of civilian women and men in countries where missions are deployed rather than effective protection of these civilians from CRSV.

The Missions need stronger systems for assessing CRSV threats and for evaluating Mission responses to sexual violence. With better systems and accountability, action plans against CRSV—like the one MONUSCO implemented in Shabunda—could become the rule rather than the exception in peacekeeping.

This report begins by providing recommendations to UN peacekeeping missions, UN Member States, and the UN Secretariat on how peacekeeping missions can improve gendered conflict analysis and protection of civilians from CRSV. Next, a background section provides information on the UN resolutions and guidelines that shape the work of peacekeeping missions, as well as other studies that have assessed gender mainstreaming by peacekeeping missions and their impact on CRSV. Four subsequent sections of the report provide analysis that supports our recommendations. These sections assess how gender-sensitive analysis and information on CRSV are included in information collection, reporting, sharing, and analysis processes in UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA. They further include examples of how these Missions are addressing CRSV, including through integrated mission planning and response. Finally, CIVIC identified a number of overarching issues that have an impact on the ability of missions to effectively incorporate gender into analysis and respond to CRSV, including the availability of strategic guidance, the prioritization of CRSV by leadership, the existence of accountability mechanisms, the availability of training, and mission staffing. These factors influence many areas of protection and peacekeeper performance, but our report specifically examines how they support or undercut the ability of UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA to protect civilians from CRSV.

The Missions need stronger systems for assessing CRSV threats and for evaluating Mission responses to sexual violence.

While our analysis briefly touches on issues such as gender parity and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), it does not focus on these issues. In addition, this report does not discuss some of the underlying societal inequalities that contribute to CRSV, such as the absence of women in government positions or their disempowerment in peace processes. Peer organizations focus more heavily on these factors, and CIVIC's expertise is better suited to analyze protection of civilians from CRSV. While we touch on some of the important contributions of UN police personnel in addressing CRSV, the number of interviews CIVIC was able to carry out with police personnel was limited, which restricted our ability to include detailed analysis and recommendations on their role in many sections of this report. Finally, while CIVIC recognizes the importance of intersectionality to any analysis or protection approach (elaborated on in the methodology section of this report), our research findings did not enable us to provide any substantive analysis of how the Missions consider intersectionality or pair gender with other demographic factors in their data collection and analysis.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS

To UN Peacekeeping Missions:
Engaging Women and Men Equally on CRSV Threats in Peacekeeping Deployment Contexts

- Continue to ensure that women community members make up a significant proportion of participants in early warning forums;
- More systematically consider barriers to the effective participation of women community leaders in early warning forums. Adjust practices and, when necessary, commit resources to promote the substantive participation of both women and men in forums where protection threats like CRSV are discussed;
- Regularly evaluate—at the headquarters and field levels—whether missions are adequately engaging women-led and women-focused civil society organizations; and
- Reinforce support to the CRSV monitoring efforts of women-led and focused civil society organizations.

Staffing and Training

- Work with the Secretariat to adjust hiring practices and other policies that prevent women from serving in key mission posts that involve community engagement, such as community liaison assistant and language assistant posts;
- Ensure that mission Female Engagement Teams (FETs) and mixed engagement teams are more strategically deployed and utilized to address CRSV threats;
- Continue to request funding for key CRSV and gender specialist posts, such as Senior Women Protection Advisors, Women Protection Advisors, Gender Advisors, and Force Gender Advisors; and
- Continue to provide staff with in-mission training on CRSV. To the extent possible, within mission capacity, ensure training includes practical and scenario-based exercises. Incorporate training on gender-sensitive conflict analysis and CRSV into senior leadership retreats.

Assessment, Planning, and Coordination

- Systematically incorporate analysis of CRSV hotspots into patrol planning and planning for longer-term or larger-scale deployments;
- Strengthen coordination among the different activities of mission sections aimed at addressing CRSV. Coordination can be facilitated through a mission-wide strategy, location-specific action plans, or mainstreaming CRSV into existing strategies and coordination bodies;
- Enhance collaboration between mission analysts and the protection, gender, and CRSV specialists to ensure that early warning analysis considers threats of CRSV;
- Embed Force Gender Advisors in the planning cell of the military headquarters to ensure gender analysis is adequately considered during operational planning;
- Improve standardization of internal mission reporting on protection threats, ensure that reporting requirements include reporting on CRSV, and ensure that these requirements are regularly updated and disseminated to staff; and
- Ensure that measures taken to improve implementation of the monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements (MARA) on CRSV are maintained despite staff turnover within missions.

Engaging Host State Governments, Security Forces, and Armed Non-State Groups

- Continue to raise awareness of CRSV with national stakeholders and, when appropriate, condition support to national security actors on improvements in their efforts to prevent and address CRSV, in line with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP);
- Regularly accompany human rights reporting on CRSV with political engagement of government officials, state security forces, and non-state armed actors in a position to address violations and promote accountability for CRSV; and

- Dedicate sufficient resources for a robust implementation of the HRDDP to ensure that UN support to national security forces is not used to commit human rights violations, including CRSV.

To UN Member States:

Mandates and Peacekeeping Performance

- Continue to explicitly mandate peacekeeping missions to protect civilians from CRSV and support accountability for CRSV. When Member States make a concerted effort to streamline mandates, CRSV should maintain its relative prominence in operative paragraphs, even when mandates are shortened; and
- Continue to support peacekeeping performance and accountability initiatives, including through funding and diplomatic engagement. Ensure these initiatives incorporate both qualitative and quantitative analysis, baselines, and indicators, and that they track and address the responsiveness of missions to CRSV at multiple levels, including the responsiveness of civilian components, uniformed units, and individual personnel in addition to the missions as a whole.

Staffing and Training

- Continue to approve funding, and consider providing additional voluntary funding, for vital gender and CRSV specialist posts in missions, such as Women Protection Advisors and Gender Affairs Officers;
- Consider direct secondments of highly qualified civilian and uniformed government officials with gender expertise into peacekeeping missions;
- Reinforce pre-deployment training for troops on CRSV, including practical and scenario-based training on how to identify and respond to CRSV threats as well as effective community engagement and patrolling;
- Provide adequate and consistent funding for civil-military coordinator positions and GBV sub-cluster coordinator positions in South Sudan, the DRC, and the Central African Republic (CAR) to facilitate information sharing between humanitarians and peacekeepers on CRSV; and
- Consider lengthening the deployments of Force Gender Advisors to one year and increase the time period that Force Gender Advisors overlap in missions to allow for an adequate handover.

Engaging Host State Governments, Security Forces, and Armed Non-State Groups

- Engage with host state governments, urging them to develop and implement national action plans against CRSV and to include CRSV prevention and response measures in peace agreements as well as national political and security strategies; and
- Encourage and support host state governments to prosecute alleged perpetrators of CRSV and to undertake security sector reforms to adequately incorporate CRSV prevention and other gender-related concerns.

To the UN Secretariat:

- Promptly translate the UN Policy and Handbook for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence into the six official languages of the UN;
- Ensure the Policy and Handbook are disseminated to all UN personnel, including those serving in peacekeeping missions, as well as to Member States contributing personnel to peacekeeping missions or supporting troop contributing countries with capacity building;
- Prioritize competencies linked to gender, human rights, protection of civilians, and CRSV in the identification of senior mission leadership, including civilian, military, and police officials;
- Build rosters of uniformed and civilian personnel with gender and CRSV expertise and adjust recruitment policies and practices to bring broader expertise on gender and CRSV into missions;
- Ensure troops are evaluated on their understanding of gender and CRSV before they are deployed to peacekeeping missions; and
- Regularly publish mission statistics on whether and how peacekeeping operations and related stakeholders are meeting the 15 core WPS indicators established by the UN.

III. METHODOLOGY

This report is based on an analysis of 265 interviews conducted with stakeholders. Of those interviews, 78 were with civilian peacekeepers, 17 were with military peacekeepers, 8 were with police peacekeepers, 59 were with humanitarian or development actors, 59 were with civil society leaders, 25 were with civilians, 11 were with host nation government officials, and 8 were with subject matter experts. Interviews were carried out in the Juba and Yei areas of South Sudan; in the Kinshasa, Goma, Kalemie, Masisi, and Nyabiondo areas of the DRC; and in the Bangui, Bangassou, and Kaga-Bandoro areas of the CAR.

All interviews for this report were conducted using a qualitative, semi-structured format. On average, interviews lasted approximately one hour, but they ranged from thirty minutes to two hours. During these interviews, CIVIC discussed gender and CRSV with participants for varying amounts of time. Most interviews were carried out on an individual basis, but CIVIC occasionally spoke with multiple interviewees at one time based on the preferences of the participants. One focus group discussion was held in South Sudan with 11 participants. CIVIC held two focus group discussions in the DRC with four and six participants, respectively. CIVIC identified participants using purposive and snowball sampling techniques. Analysis of interviews was conducted using MAXQDA software, which allowed CIVIC to more easily code and identify trends across the large number of interviews consulted during the drafting of this report.

CIVIC took steps to ensure that the local community voices incorporated into our research reflect a balanced gender ratio. Of the civilians we spoke with, 14 were women and 11 were men. We interviewed 32 female civil society leaders and 27 male civil society leaders. When approaching interview participants, we were also mindful of other demographic factors such as age, ethnicity, education level, and an individual's status as part of a displaced or host community. We tried to engage a representative cross-section of individuals in each area where we conducted interviews.

CIVIC recognizes the importance of intersectionality in evaluating protection threats. Civilians' experiences of harm and sexual violence are linked not only to their gender, but to how their gender interacts with their age, ethnicity, social status, physical abilities, political affiliation, sexual orientation, and a variety of other factors. However, in our analysis and report, we focus exclusively on how peacekeeping missions are incorporating gender into their threat analysis and how they are responding responding to CRSV. We do not analyze how peacekeeping missions consider other demographic factors in their analysis or efforts to address CRSV. Focusing exclusively on gender allowed CIVIC to provide more detailed analysis that would not have been possible had we broadened the scope of our research to include other factors.

CRSV and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) are categories of harm that overlap partially, but they are also distinct in their definitions and in the UN bodies and personnel that have been established to address them. As much as possible, CIVIC has attempted to focus our research and report on the narrow topic of CRSV and gender-sensitive analysis of protection threats. However, because of the overlapping nature of CRSV and SGBV, we do occasionally reference UN resolutions or mission strategies, activities, and operations that focus on the broader category of SGBV when these texts and efforts are also intended to address CRSV. In some cases, UN resolutions, research by other organizations, and participants in CIVIC research interviews use the ambiguous terminology of "sexual violence." In these cases, we have maintained their original terminology when we quote, reference, or discuss them.

We have withheld the names and other potentially identifying information of our sources. However, we provide information on the location of the interview and the participant's status as a peacekeeper, humanitarian actor, civil society leader, or civilian. Every interview that CIVIC conducted within each country over the course of a calendar year

is assigned a unique interview number and is individually cited in our footnotes. All of the factual assertions presented in this report have been corroborated by at least three interview participants unless it is clearly stated otherwise in the text of the report. Finally, while there was significant overlap in the types of questions asked during our semi-structured interviews across the three countries where we conducted research, there was also some variance in the focus of interviews. Therefore, the absence of citations on certain topics from civilians or civil society leaders in a particular country—such as the quality of peacekeeper patrolling or justice and accountability initiatives—does not necessarily mean that stakeholders from that country do not have critical views on these issues. It may simply reflect the possibility that participants were not asked about those topics during interviews.



UN Photo/Mark Garten

September 30, 2009. *Wide view of the Security Council meeting at which the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1888 (2009), reiterating its demand for the immediate and complete cessation of acts of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict.*

IV. BACKGROUND

Over the last two decades, the UN Security Council has passed ten thematic resolutions on women, peace, and security (WPS). Among other issues, these resolutions recognize the connection between sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and the success and durability of peace processes. They also outline the expectations for and role of peacekeeping missions in preventing and responding to SGBV and CRSV. The first of these ten resolutions, UNSC Resolution 1325, was passed in 2000. It recognized the importance of women's participation in peace efforts and called on the UN to incorporate gender perspectives into their protection efforts. In 2008, the UNSC passed Resolution 1820, which recognized conflict-related sexual violence as a threat to international peace and security and asked the UN to develop appropriate training programs for peacekeepers to enable them to better recognize, prevent, and respond to sexual violence.[7] It also encouraged troop and police contributing countries to heighten their personnel's awareness and responsiveness to protection of civilians, including by protecting women and children from sexual violence.[8] UNSC Resolution 1888, approved one year later, explicitly identified the protection of women and children from sexual violence as a responsibility of peacekeeping missions and expressed an intention to task missions with preventing and responding to sexual violence through individual mission mandates.[9] To help missions fulfill their role combatting CRSV, the resolution asked the Secretary-General to deploy, as needed, Women Protection Advisors (WPAs) in peacekeeping missions.[10] Building on this identified staffing need, UNSC Resolution 1960 (2010) welcomed the appointment of Gender Advisors to Missions and requested the Secretary-General to establish monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements on CRSV.[11]

Because UN peacekeeping missions and their UN agency counterparts were slow to implement many of these recommendations, subsequent resolutions on women, peace, and security reiterate in more urgent, explicit, and detailed terms the importance of mission action to combat sexual violence and the role missions should play in doing so. For example, UNSC Resolution 2106 (2013) recognized "the need for more systematic monitoring of and attention to sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations,"[12] while UNSC Resolution 2242 (2015) urged the UN entities backstopping peacekeeping missions "to ensure the necessary gender analysis and technical gender expertise is included throughout all stages of mission planning, mandate development, implementation, review and mission drawdown."[13]

TEXTBOX A: DEFINING KEY CONCEPTS

The definitions in this textbox are adapted from UN policies and guidelines.[14] They help form a common understanding of gender-related concepts and activities. As outlined in the definitions below, the set of violations that comprise CRSV are a subset of the broader violations that can be categorized as SGBV. In this report, CIVIC is primarily concerned with CRSV, and not the broader set of categories that are included within the term SGBV. However, when individuals interviewed by CIVIC for this report referred to SGBV rather than CRSV, we maintained the terminology and category of violence they referenced in this report. Similarly, many UNSC resolutions and participants refer to "sexual violence" rather than SGBV or CRSV specifically. When texts use or individuals referenced the more ambiguous term "sexual violence" we have also adopted the original terminology used by our source.

While the WPS resolutions place an emphasis on protection of women and girls from CRSV, men and boys are also victims of CRSV. Rather than being only about women and girls, gender-sensitive conflict analysis is about developing a wholistic and nuanced understanding of how power dynamics and societal roles affect the security of civilians.

Gender: The socially constructed identities, attributes, and roles of persons in relation to their sex and the social and cultural meanings attached to biological differences based on sex. The meaning of such socially constructed identities, attributes, and roles varies across societies, communities and groups, and over time. This often results in hierarchical relationships between women and men and an unequal distribution of power and rights, favoring men and disadvantaging women and affecting all members of society.

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV): Violence directed toward, or disproportionately affecting, someone because of their gender or sex. Such violence takes multiple forms, including acts or omissions intended or likely to cause or result in death or physical, sexual, psychological or economic harm or suffering, threats of such acts, harassment, coercion and arbitrary deprivation of liberty.

Conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV): Rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls, or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to conflict. That link may be evident in the profile of the perpetrator, who is often affiliated with a state or non-state armed group, which includes terrorist entities; the profile of the victim, who is frequently an actual or perceived member of a political, ethnic or religious minority group or targeted on the basis of actual or perceived sexual orientation or gender identity; the climate of impunity, which is generally associated with state collapse, cross-border consequences such as displacement or trafficking, and/or violations of a ceasefire agreement. The term also encompasses trafficking in persons for the purpose of sexual violence or exploitation when committed in situations of conflict.

Gender analysis: Methods used to understand the relationships between men and women, their access to resources, their activities, and the constraints they face relative to each other. A gender-responsive conflict analysis also considers how gender shapes, and is shaped by, conflict.

Since these UNSC resolutions on WPS were adopted, different UN entities have collaborated to draft policies and guidelines that distill aspects of them into clearer expectations and tasks for peacekeeping missions, including protection from CRSV. The most recent and comprehensive of these is the Policy for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (the Policy) and the accompanying Handbook, prepared jointly by the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO), the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (O-SRSG SVC). The Policy emphasizes that preventing and responding to CRSV is a responsibility shared by all mission components, with heads of missions ultimately responsible for promoting a coordinated, mission-wide approach to addressing CRSV. According to the Policy, the primary objectives or lines of effort for a mission's work in this area are: the prevention and protection of persons facing the risk of CRSV; ending impunity for CRSV, building awareness and condemnation of CRSV, and developing the capacity of national actors to effectively address CRSV; and the empowerment of survivors through political processes.

Recent policies and handbooks developed by the UN on the protection of civilians and child protection make clear that there should be coherence and complementarity between activities carried out in support of a mission's broader POC mandate and the more specific activities focused on protection of women, CRSV, and child protection. The DPO Handbook on The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, for example, includes guidance for staff on how to carry out gendered analysis and advises that "protection of civilians analysis should consider how issues of gender and diversity interact with risk and vulnerability and think about the role different groups play in early warning and prevention."[15]

Several studies by scholars and non-governmental organizations have attempted to evaluate how effectively peacekeeping missions are fulfilling the role of combatting CRSV as outlined for them in UNSC resolutions and guidelines. One 2019 study concluded that peacekeeping missions reduce the chance of sexual violence and limit its prevalence. The researchers noted that larger, multidimensional missions were more likely to deter sexual violence and that their ability to do so was linked to the capacity of uniformed personnel to use force and to the existence of civilian-led programming.[16] A second 2019 study found that, overall, peacekeeping missions had a limited impact on the reduction of sexual violence. However, it concluded that missions were more likely to be successful in reducing sexual violence if they included a large police component, if they were mandated to protect civilians, and if armed actors exercised a high level of control over their members.[17]

An annual report by the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security evaluates implementation of the WPS resolutions by reviewing UNSC meetings and statements. Their most recent report concluded that the UN's WPS efforts were "superficial, ad hoc, and inconsistent," with "a lack of accountability for failure to fully implement all provisions."[18] They noted an increase in the number and types of references to gender-related issues in peacekeeping mission mandates as well as an increase in content on WPS in mission reporting to the UNSC. However, they noted that the majority of information in mission reports focused on activities carried out by missions without providing any information on the impact of those activities. They also observed that data on human rights violations committed against women was followed by analysis explaining the data less than 15 percent of the time, limiting the usefulness of the data to the UN Secretariat and Member States.[19] The result, according to the Working Group, is that "the Council continues to make decisions based on information that is mostly gender-blind."[20]

Evaluations carried out directly by the UN have reached similar conclusions. In 2015, the UN published a Global Study on the Implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325. This review highlighted progress the UN has made in establishing the positions and structures in peacekeeping missions to implement the resolution as well as creating the guidance and training materials required by staff. However, it also concluded that these efforts lack consistent support from mission leadership and are

often viewed as obligations rather than tools for improving missions' effectiveness.[21] More recent audits carried out by the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) similarly acknowledge a failure of senior mission leadership to prioritize WPS and hold staff accountable for incorporating gender into their work. The audits identified gaps in training, mission strategies, and staffing.[22]

As the relevant CRSV-focused sections of WPS resolutions and UN guidance documents make clear, peacekeeping missions have a key role to play in protecting civilians from CRSV. However, peacekeeping missions are not solely responsible for implementing these resolutions and guidelines. Missions are intended to work in collaboration with other UN entities, such as UN Women and the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), which helps chair a sub-cluster of other organizations working on gender-based violence.[23] Additionally, the O-SRSG SVC can draw international attention to sexual violence through high-level visits, establish Joint-Communiques between the UN and host countries to address CRSV, and deploy the UN Team of Experts on Sexual Violence in Conflict to assist national authorities in strengthening the rule of law and accountability for CRSV. At the country level, there are also many international and national non-governmental organizations implementing activities to counter CRSV. When appropriate, missions can coordinate, support, and share information with these actors.

Despite the collective efforts of UN entities and organizations to address sexual violence and their potentially positive impact on the reduction of sexual violence, the scale of the problem remains massive in the countries covered by this report. A 2017 survey in South Sudan found that 28 percent of women interviewed in Juba and 33 percent of women interviewed in Rumbek had experienced rape, attempted rape, or other forms of sexual assault by a non-partner. For men, those numbers were nine percent and six percent, respectively.[24] In the CAR, Doctors Without Borders and the Gender Based Violence Information Management System collectively recorded 6,225 cases of SGBV in 2018, meaning that, on average, 17 cases of SGBV occurred each day.[25] Most protection actors interviewed by CIVIC in these contexts recognized that the numbers of reported cases of sexual violence are far below the actual number of cases. Sexual violence often goes unreported because of entrenched gender inequalities, the fear of reprisal due to confidentiality issues, and the societal stigma attached to CRSV and SGBV. Where medical services are unavailable, there is little motivation for survivors to come forward, and many violations occur in areas that are too remote or inaccessible for protection actors to investigate and record them.[26]

Humanitarians in these contexts are quick to acknowledge that there is inadequate funding and programming of every type to support survivors of CRSV, including insufficient medical and psychological care, legal support, and safe houses.[27] An investigation by UNMISS's Human Rights Division concluded that, in South Sudan, "the lack of Government funding, coupled with the inability of international organizations to make the medical response to sexual violence a priority, have contributed to an inadequate medical response for survivors." Additionally, it states that "the capacity of the health system to provide mental health care, though critical in addressing trauma resulting from sexual violence, is nearly non-existent."[28]

CRSV takes many forms when it occurs, and the perpetrators who commit acts of sexual violence do so for a variety of reasons.[29] Although CIVIC researchers discussed the dynamics of CRSV with interview participants, this report does not provide an overview of the types of CRSV perpetrated in South Sudan, the DRC, or the CAR. Understanding the different types of CRSV prevalent in their countries of deployment, as well as the motivations of perpetrators, is critical for peacekeepers to effectively prevent and respond to CRSV. The intent of this report is to analyze how effectively missions are able to understand and respond to those dynamics, rather than to provide analysis of the violence itself.

V. COLLECTING AND REPORTING INFORMATION ABOUT CRSV THREATS

"Most of our sources are men. So, I have been asking people to have more female sources so we can have different aspects of one same event."[30]

"Forcing you to consider what is different for 50 percent of the population will change analysis."[31]

As emphasized in the UN Policy and Handbook for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, addressing CRSV is the collective responsibility of all components of a peacekeeping mission. This responsibility begins with the process of collecting and analyzing information on threats of sexual violence. Peacekeeping missions have human rights, protection, CRSV, and gender specialists who play a key role in helping to collect and analyze information on CRSV. These specialists include Protection of Civilians Advisors, Women Protection Advisors, Gender Affairs Officers, and Force Gender Advisors (see Textbox E for more detail). In addition to these specialists, the mission sections most closely involved in the process of information collection and analysis are Civil Affairs Divisions, Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMACs), Joint Operations Centers (JOCs), U2 branches of the military component, and UN Police (UNPOL) officers (see Textbox B for more detail).

To be able to adequately identify CRSV threats affecting women, men, girls, and boys, peacekeeping missions have to ensure they are equally engaging women and men and that they are in regular contact with civil society organizations focused on reducing CRSV. Female peacekeepers are not inherently any more knowledgeable about CRSV or more likely to prevent it than their male counterparts.[32] However, stakeholders largely agree that, in at least some cases, female peacekeepers are better able to access women in communities and that some women survivors of CRSV feel more comfortable reporting CRSV to female peacekeepers. Therefore, having female peacekeepers deployed in community engagement roles alongside their male counterparts can help ensure peacekeeping missions are able to access information on CRSV from both men and women. Yet gender parity alone is not enough. Missions also need to ensure that the personnel responsible for collecting information—whether male or female—have a basic understanding of the warning signs of CRSV and prioritize collecting sex-disaggregated information on threats and information related to sexual violence.

> ***Addressing CRSV is the collective responsibility of all components of a peacekeeping mission.***



UN Photo/Michael Ali

March 7, 2018. *Female peacekeepers serving in MONUSCO's South African contingent carry out a foot patrol from Mavivi to Muzambayi to gather information on the security situation in the area.*

TEXTBOX B: HIGHLIGHTING KEY MISSION PERSONNEL CONTRIBUTING TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF THREATS AND EARLY WARNING ON CRSV

Civil Affairs: While the work of Civil Affairs Divisions can vary significantly from one peacekeeping mission to another, their staff serve as the primary link between missions, local authorities, and communities where they work to strengthen the social and civic conditions necessary to consolidate peace processes.[33] Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs)—national staff within the Civil Affairs section—are often responsible for establishing and managing community alert networks to identify protection threats. They also sometimes support the development and activities of local protection committees made up of influential community actors or civil society leaders who draft and carry out their own plans for improving security.

The JOC: JOCs are information hubs established to foster situational awareness in missions. They consolidate daily, weekly, and monthly reports from different sections into integrated reporting, coordinate day-to-day operational activities, and chair weekly information-sharing meetings. During emergencies, they serve as crisis-management bodies.

The JMAC: JMACs are the main body in missions responsible for developing integrated threat analysis to inform decision-making and action by a mission's leadership. Ideally, they should be composed of a combination of civilian and military experts. They produce weekly early-warning or threat assessment reports as well as more in-depth analysis of perpetrators and flash reports to draw attention to developing high-risk situations. To do so, they maintain their own networks of contacts but also rely heavily on the information collected and reported by other mission sections.

The U2 branch of the Force: U2 sections are responsible for managing intelligence within the military component. U2 officers in field locations report on local development to the U2 chief at headquarters, and the U2 chief often manages intelligence assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles and imagery obtained from helicopters.

UNPOL: UNPOL officers are tasked with establishing public safety, preventing crimes, and facilitating law and order. In practice, their work often involves co-locating with host state police to mentor, monitor, advise, and build the capacity of national police forces. This role can place UNPOL officers at the forefront of recording and tracking cases of violence against civilians, including CRSV.

Human Rights Division: Human Rights Officers are responsible for monitoring, investigating, documenting, and reporting on human rights violations, including CRSV. They also build the capacity of national actors to monitor and investigate human rights violations and promote the compliance of national security and justice systems with international norms and standards. Human Rights Divisions are fully integrated into peacekeeping missions, but they are also jointly managed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and have a dual reporting line to OHCHR.

POC Advisors: POC Advisors and Senior POC Advisors provide guidance to mission leadership on the overall implementation of a mission's mandate to protect civilians. To do so, they often map and assess threats to civilians, ensure that POC analysis is included in relevant documents and reports, oversee the development and implementation of mission-wide POC strategies, and coordinate or lead information-sharing meetings on POC.

Engaging Women and Female-led or Focused Civil Society Organizations

Many stakeholders who spoke with CIVIC emphasized the importance of peacekeeping missions engaging women as well as men to ensure that they are adequately addressing the protection threats of all civilians.[34] "What surprised us is that the information we get from men, women, and children is different, and this informs us how to plan," observed one MONUSCO civilian official.[35] In some cases, however, interviewees identified specific barriers preventing women from being able to communicate threats to missions.[36] For instance, some civilians and civil society leaders in South Sudan emphasized that lower levels of education and English language skills among women and elderly civilians made it significantly more difficult for them to approach peacekeepers.[37]

Stakeholders, including civilians and civil society leaders, also emphasized that having more female peacekeepers deployed and hired into roles that focus on community engagement would improve the ability of missions to collect information on CRSV from women.[38] One peacekeeper in the DRC explained, "We need to interact with both men and women, and to be able to do this we need, among ourselves, more women."[39] A humanitarian speaking about the low levels of women deployed in MINUSCA's military component said, "That has an influence, obviously, on their ability to understand the problems and challenges of the community…that leaves the analysis distorted."[40]

In particular, missions have struggled to hire female national staff, such as CLAs and language assistants.[41] For instance, at the time of CIVIC's research, only 16 of MINUSCA's 78 CLAs were women.[42] Some of the factors contributing to the low level of female CLAs are out of the control of UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA—such as typically lower levels of education and language ability among women and societal norms that make it difficult for women to work alongside male soldiers, relocate away from their families, or travel to insecure areas.[43] In other cases, the Missions struggle to adjust historic staffing imbalances because policies make it difficult for them to terminate existing CLA contracts or hire CLAs from outside the area where they will be deployed for their work. However, adjustments to some Mission policies and practices could improve their ability to hire female CLAs. In the CAR, for example, CLAs are not allowed to live in MINUSCA bases, which can exacerbate the potential risks and barriers to women being hired into these roles.[44]

Overall, CIVIC's research found that there has been a concerted effort by missions over the last several years to ensure that women make up a larger and more equitable portion of the people they are engaging for their threat analysis and assessments. For example, Civil Affairs personnel in both MONUSCO and MINUSCA are now tracking what percentage of their community alert networks (CANs) and local protection committees (LPCs) are men versus women, and they are trying to ensure that women make up at least 30 percent of each group.[45] Describing the impact of this policy on the Mission, one MONUSCO civilian official said, "We are now identifying protection needs of women, because they are participants, and not only seeing the protection needs of men."[46] In UNMISS, Civil Affairs staff do not contribute to the development of CANs and LPCs. However, UNMISS's Civil Affairs Division has a guidance note on gender mainstreaming that instructs staff to "consult with women's groups and networks as well as individual women and girls to learn how the given situation affects them differently from men and boys." The guidance note also instructs staff to "ensure regular meetings and other consultations with women and men to obtain gender-sensitive indicators of impending communal conflicts."[47]

Mission officials in MONUSCO and UNMISS also reported to CIVIC that JMAC analysts have attempted to diversify their networks to ensure that they are speaking with more women and are more carefully considering a variety of demographic factors when they collect information.[48] Additionally, these Missions have begun utilizing female engagement teams (FETs) or mixed engagement teams with a higher number of female troops than other patrols to allow greater interaction between the Force and women in communities. These teams can be especially important when peacekeeping troops are deployed to remote areas with few or no civilian staff to reach out to the population about protection threats and CRSV incidents.

TEXTBOX C: ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEMALE ENGAGEMENT TEAMS (FETS)

MINUSCA was an early adopter of FETs comprised of all female peacekeepers from the Zambian Battalion. These units placed an emphasis on accessing and engaging women. The expectation was that all-female units would be better accepted by women and have improved access to information about the threats facing them.[49] Since then, the concept has been utilized by a variety of troop contributing countries deployed to other missions, and it is recognized in the United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual as a key capability for engagement.[50] Sometimes, the term "female engagement team" is used by different missions to refer broadly to units that have a higher number of female troops than most units, even if they are not entirely composed of women. Such units are also called mixed engagement teams or, simply, engagement teams (ETs). A number of UN and Mission officials who spoke with CIVIC voiced a preference for teams to be mixed rather than all-female.[51] One MONUSCO military official explained this preference by noting that having all-female teams perpetuates the idea that gender is only about women rather than about understanding the perspectives of all segments of society. The official also noted that mixed teams were better-equipped to interview both men and women.[52]

Most peacekeepers interviewed by CIVIC felt that having FETs or mixed engagement teams did improve their Mission's ability to engage with women and potentially learn about experiences of CRSV.[53] However, Mission officials were not always able to explain the benefit in concrete terms or answer more detailed questions about the work and impact of these teams. For example, there was disagreement among Mission personnel about whether reporting on CRSV and gendered-threats by FETs was better than other troops[54] or the same.[55] One MONUSCO military official told CIVIC, "FETs, we just do it like window dressing and it is a nice photo, but we are not getting back to what their [women's] needs are."[56] However, several other MONUSCO officials gave examples of FETs being intentionally deployed to areas where there were reports of CRSV or where peacekeepers suspected it was occurring to document and verify these threats.[57] A MINUSCA military official told CIVIC that one of the FETs in the Mission had specifically developed an action plan for documenting and responding to CRSV.[58]

These differences in opinion and perspective can partly be attributed to how FETs and mixed engagement teams are utilized and managed by UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA. "Currently there is a lack of strategic, operational, and tactical clarity on what is the end state and what is intended on the ground to be achieved [with gender-integrated patrols]," observed one UNMISS military official.[59] To be useful, sector and battalion commanders have to recognize their value, and the Missions need to strategically deploy them. Missions should also better monitor and make use of their reporting and ensure that key personnel, like Force Gender Advisors, have access to their reports.[60]

While most peacekeepers expressed to CIVIC that, under the right circumstances, mixed engagement teams can be an asset for missions, they also stressed the need for all peacekeepers to be better-trained, empowered, and responsible for effectively engaging civilians on gendered-threats. "If the problem is community engagement at large and how [the] Force is conducting patrols, this is the issue that needs to be addressed," explained one MONUSCO civilian official. He added, "Don't use these FETs as the silver bullet. ...FETs could be used in certain areas, but don't address the basic issues of troops who don't speak the language or who don't stop in villages to speak with people."[61]

In field locations where CIVIC conducted research, we observed that peacekeeping missions are regularly in contact with prominent and active women-led and focused civil society organizations who can provide them with information on CRSV threats.[62] In some cases, the Missions support these local organizations through projects, such as trainings and income-generating activities, and help build their capacity to monitor threats.[63] For example, in Kalemie—the capital of the DRC's Tanganyika province—all of the women-focused civil society organizations that CIVIC reached out to were in contact with MONUSCO's local Human Rights Officers and felt that MONUSCO's presence and activities provided instrumental support to their human rights monitoring work.[64] These efforts are not uniform, however, and civil society leaders in some areas advocated for improved access to peacekeepers.[65]

The primary interlocutor for women-focused civil society organizations differs from location to location, but Civil Affairs and Human Rights sections usually take the lead on engaging these organizations. In the CAR, MINUSCA's Gender Affairs Unit also plays a particularly strong role in maintaining contact with female-led and women-focused civil society groups. While the Gender Affairs Unit is not mandated to monitor or report on CRSV, MINUSCA staff observed that the strong relationships the Gender Affairs Unit has built with civil society leaders facilitates the work of other Mission sections to monitor and track CRSV.[66] Stakeholders in the CAR also recognized UNPOL as playing a leading role engaging civil society organizations to document and address a range of SGBV incidents, including CRSV.[67]

Because there are often barriers to women's participation in South Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR, and because the human rights of women are not always equally respected in these contexts, the Missions may need to devote additional effort and planning to ensure they are effectively engaging women on CRSV. Additional steps to improve disclosure of CRSV can include holding meetings separately with men and women where and when mixed meetings appear to discourage reporting,[68] working with women to strengthen their capacity to participate in joint meetings,[69] and ensuring that meetings are hosted at times and in locations where women are most readily available to participate.[70]

Illustrating the significance of such these efforts, one MINUSCA civilian official told CIVIC, "We were talking about what is the threat and what is the risk and the women weren't able to talk. They are victims and they can't speak about it in front of men who are perpetrators."[71] In response to this concern, according to the official, MINUSCA organized consultative forums exclusively for women. A civil society leader in the CAR similarly explained, "It is important that women participate as actively as men in consultative meetings and decision-making [forums]. To do this, we ask MINUSCA to multiply training and capacity building for women, to motivate them and put them at the same level of discussion and responsibility."[72] A number of other peacekeepers who spoke with CIVIC also described taking concerted action to empower women in information-sharing forums.[73] However, while personnel in the three Missions appear to have an increased awareness of these needs, they do not seem to be systematically or uniformly analyzing or addressing barriers to effective women's participation in protection and security forums.[74]

To adequately collect the perspectives of women on protection threats, UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA should continue to ensure that women make up a significant proportion of the individuals who participate in CANs, LPCs, and other early warning forums. Mission personnel should further ensure that they are more systematically considering barriers to women's effective participation in these forums and adjusting their practices as needed to promote the substantive participation of women and men. This may include, not only adjusting forums, but adjusting hiring and human resources policies so that women are in key community engagement positions, such as CLA and language assistant posts. Missions, including Heads of Field Offices, should also regularly evaluate whether they have adequate forums in place to engage women-led and focused civil society organizations in their area of operations.[75] Finally, Force Commanders and Sector Commanders should more strategically deploy and utilize FETs and mixed engagement teams and improve oversight of their activities and reporting.

CRSV committed against men and boys, while often less prevalent than CRSV against women and girls, is also regularly overlooked by a variety of actors mandated to address CRSV.[76] Furthermore, men

may be reluctant to discuss personal experiences of CRSV or CRSV perpetrated against other men or boys in their communities when women are present. In addition to the recommendations above, Missions may therefore want to consider how they can tailor their engagement with communities to record potential CRSV perpetrated against men and boys.

Ensuring Gender-Related Protection Concerns are Included in Internal Reporting

To ensure they are collecting important information about potential or ongoing CRSV threats, Missions need to do more than engage women. As outlined in UN policy, peacekeeping missions should establish priority Intelligence Requirements (IRs) and Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIRs) that clearly outline to all staff what information is essential for operational effectiveness.[77] Because IRs and CCIRs provide guidance to mission personnel on what information to collect, record, and report, early warning indicators of CRSV should be included in these information requirements.

Standardized templates outlining what information should be included in each report can help guarantee that key information on CRSV is incorporated into reports. IRs, CCIRs, and templates should make clear that data on incidents should be sex-disaggregated whenever possible so that missions know whether perpetrators and survivors are men or women. "One of the essential things is making sure our data is sex and age disaggregated, as a bare minimum and that analysis shows that," summarized a MONUSCO official.[78] Having priority IRs, CCIRs, and standardized reporting that includes sex-disaggregated data is important because much of the analysis done by missions is carried out by POC advisors, JOC officers, Human Rights Officers, and JMAC analysts in mission headquarters. They rely heavily on information reported from staff in field locations to carry out analysis, and they cannot include a gender dimension in the analysis if they don't receive adequate data.

CIVIC found that some form of IR or CCIR that includes information requirements about CRSV is in place in all three Missions.[79] For example, UNMISS's Force Operations Order includes areas where action is needed to prevent gender-based violence as an IR and tasks the U2 section with tracking the issue.[80] However, interviews also indicated that only the personnel most responsible for establishing and managing the requirements were aware of their existence. Staff who should have been reporting against the requirements were unaware of them, leaving a potential gap in early warning for CRSV. This gap is primarily a result of staff turnover and vacancies, including turnover at the highest levels of the military component, which undermines awareness of information and reporting requirements.[81]

> *"One of the essential things is making sure our data is sex and age disaggregated, as a bare minimum and that analysis shows that."*
>
> *— MONUSCO civilian official*

Peacekeepers generally observed to CIVIC that the quality of reporting on CRSV—as well as whether the reported data is sex-disaggregated—typically varies across Mission components and sections. Personnel lamented that, among peacekeeping troops, the quality of reporting on CRSV is often tied to how much training troops receive before deployment and reflects whether human rights and addressing CRSV are priorities within their national security institutions.[82] For example, one MINUSCA military official noted, "With gender, there is more or less focus depending on the contingent."[83]

His colleague elaborated, "Here, they [troops] are a reflection of their own country."[84] Speaking about his own work, a third MINUSCA military official told CIVIC, "I am focused almost exclusively on armed groups, and by attacking or affecting them, hopefully we are having an impact on sexual violence."[85] Across the three Missions, personnel interviewed by CIVIC tended to speak more highly about the inclusion of gender-related concerns and sex-disaggregated data in the reporting of the civilian and police components, than they did about reporting by the military component.[86] In MINUSCA in particular, a number of military personnel stated that collecting and reporting on this data was primarily the responsibility of civilian sections.[87]

Peacekeeping personnel acknowledged these challenges while also indicating that improvements to CRSV-related reporting were underway.[88] In the DRC, a number of peacekeepers told CIVIC that reporting of sex-disaggregated data has improved significantly over the last year and that many sections and components are now including sex-disaggregated data in their internal incident reports.[89] "It is a relatively new process. We are changing the cultural approach to how we work," explained one MONUSCO official.[90] Moreover, Mission personnel described initiatives to ensure that CRSV is more regularly included in internal reporting by peacekeeping troops. For example, protection and gender-focused staff in MONUSCO and MINUSCA have created pocket cards for troops explaining how to identify and react to potential cases of CRSV in a simple and condensed format that can be carried at all times.[91] Of course, creating pocket cards is easier than ensuring they are distributed to troops and consistently used. During CIVIC research in past years, peacekeepers have described designing similar tools that the Missions have not fully adopted or implemented.

To ensure that Missions are collecting early warning alerts on CRSV and identifying potential hotspots of CRSV, Mission leadership should confirm that CRSV-related priority IRs and CCIRs are in place and that staff are regularly trained on and reminded of these requirements. They should also standardize reporting through templates, prompt personnel for information about CRSV, and require them to disaggregate data by sex whenever possible. Checklists or pocket cards like those developed by MONUSCO could promote greater understanding on how to identify CRSV and engage with survivors, but will need to become a part of regular Mission training and practice.

VI. SHARING INFORMATION ON CRSV AND ENGENDERING MISSION ANALYSIS

"We are moving toward faster and improved flow of information and that helps with identifying [CRSV] hotspots."[92]

Protection principles dictate that all organizations should get informed consent from survivors before sharing any information about their experience of sexual violence with other actors.[93] When such consent is granted by survivors, general information-sharing on trends and hotspots of CRSV between peacekeeping missions and their UN agency and NGO counterparts can help ensure all actors have a better understanding of the gender-related threats in a country. Stakeholders in South Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR emphasized in interviews with CIVIC how difficult it is to collect and verify information on CRSV and how limited their resources are for doing so. They expressed concern that limitations on their ability to document cases can mean that what appear to be hotspots of sexual violence may actually just reflect the fact that protection actors are better able to collect data in those locations.[94] Information-sharing can help stakeholders overcome their individual limitations and more accurately identify actual hotspots of sexual violence. It can also help prevent situations where multiple organizations collect data on CRSV from the same people, which can frustrate and retraumatize survivors.

Increased volumes of information on CRSV does not translate directly into improved response to sexual violence. Missions need effective ways to ensure that information from different sources is integrated and that they are tracking trends in addition to individual cases. Missions should also carry out analysis that examines trends in CRSV, documents the gendered nature of harm, and highlights the gendered motivations and recruitment tactics of perpetrators—which can include, for example, the disenfranchisement of youth in society, armed groups appealing to socially constructed masculinities, and/or incentivizing military service by allowing soldiers to commit CRSV against the population. Such analysis can equip Mission leadership with the right evidence to make proactive decisions and prioritize interventions that effectively combat CRSV.

Information-Sharing Between Peacekeepers and Humanitarian Actors

Across country contexts, one of the primary places where humanitarian and development actors share information with each other is in the GBV sub-cluster of the wider Protection cluster.[95] Some civilian peacekeeping officials are allowed to attend these meetings—including Human Rights Officers and Women Protection Advisors—and information-sharing in these meetings can help ensure organizations have timely data to design effective responses. Reflecting on the utility of the GBV sub-cluster meetings, one humanitarian actor in South Sudan said, "For me, why it is important, after sharing information generally, we know which issues to follow up on."[96] Describing the status of information-sharing between peacekeepers and NGOs in the CAR sub-cluster, a MINUSCA civilian official said, "We have gotten much better... we are insisting that it is not just for numbers, but better programming."[97] As discussed in more detail in Textbox D, monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements (MARA) on CRSV in each Mission—while limited to peacekeepers and UN agency officials—are also helping to drive information-sharing among stakeholders working to address CRSV.

TEXTBOX D: IMPROVING INFORMATION-SHARING AND ANALYSIS THROUGH THE MARA

UNSC Resolution 1960, adopted in 2010, requested the Secretary-General to establish MARA on CRSV.[98] In line with this resolution, Women Protection Advisors in all three Missions chair the MARA Working Group. Through this mechanism, they collect, verify, and analyze data from a variety of sources that, among other purposes, informs the Secretary-General's annual report on CRSV and UNSC action.

Over the last one to two years, Senior Women Protection Advisors (SWPAs) working within the Human Rights Divisions in MONUSCO and MINUSCA have transformed the MARA process from a system largely oriented toward feeding the information needs of UN officials in New York into one of the most valuable tools these Missions have for sharing and analyzing information and trends related to CRSV. This feat was accomplished, in part, by widening the membership of monthly MARA meetings to include police, military, and civilian peacekeepers alongside UN agencies with protection and gender mandates—including UNFPA, the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA).[99] MINUSCA also extends meeting participation to field offices through video-conferencing.[100] One MINUSCA official characterized attendance at MARA meetings as having expanded from four to forty stakeholders as a result of these efforts.[101] While the membership and primary purposes of the MARA Working Groups and the GBV sub-clusters are different, the participation of UNFPA in both forums can help to facilitate coordination between them.

Wider participation in MARA meetings has been built through continued outreach by SWPAs and efforts to ensure that meetings are structured around valuable information-sharing on case numbers and trends in a way that does not compromise survivor or witness confidentiality.[102] Stakeholders in the DRC reported, for example, that the SWPAs and Human Rights Officers organized incidents into categories of CRSV and conducted analysis on the locations and perpetrators of violence rather than simply presenting case numbers. This approach drove real conversation around the dynamics of CRSV and allowed participating entities to begin thinking about and coordinating responses to the violence.[103] One UN agency official told CIVIC, "Now the things that the MARA working group is doing are amazing. …It is really [about] information analysis on early warning. …In the East, MONUSCO is our source of information to make a rapid response."[104] A MONUSCO official said, "We do get a sense that the MARA is a very significant tool to get these messages across and to mobilize the leadership, whether it is the FC [Force Commander] or DSRSG [Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General]."[105]



April 22, 2016. *Two teenagers living in the Ngam refugee camp in Cameroon after fleeing violence in the Central African Republic. UN Women supports economic and social rehabilitation for vulnerable women and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in the camp.*

Despite the ability of the GBV sub-cluster and MARA to facilitate information-sharing, there are still significant barriers to effective data exchange. One barrier is that actors use different templates and methodologies for collecting data because they have different institutional information needs and requirements. For example, NGOs often focus on the wider category of SGBV and collect a significant amount of data on categories of SGBV that might not be a priority for peacekeeping missions, such as the denial of resources based on gender. On the other hand, they might not collect information on the perpetrators of an attack, which is valuable for peacekeepers trying to profile perpetrators and determine how to prevent attacks. Moreover, when different terminology is used to collect data, it can be difficult to combine and develop into an overall understanding of the scale and nature of CRSV.[106] For this reason, some efforts have been made to create common templates for collecting data on SGBV. UNFPA officials, for example, are supporting the development of common information-collection templates as part of an Information Management System on GBV, but these tools are not always fully operational and are sometimes used by only a handful of organizations.

A combination of low levels of trust between actors and the high sensitivity of information on CRSV can also undermine information-sharing. Comprehensive guidelines exist to help UN agencies and peacekeepers determine how to safely share information with counterparts by withholding identifying details while still providing broader information that can be used as the basis for planning interventions to address violence.[107] In some cases, these guidelines have been codified into information-sharing protocols (ISPs) at the country level.[108] Even with guidelines in place, however, a number of humanitarian actors told CIVIC that they are uncomfortable sharing information about CRSV with peacekeepers because they are not confident it would be properly protected.[109] In some cases, this reluctance appears to be driven by a lack of knowledge regarding the existence of ISPs and/or the potential to establish them.[110] In other cases, trust is undermined when peacekeepers flout these guidelines. Several stakeholders described witnessing peacekeepers demand specific numbers and information about CRSV cases from humanitarians without establishing a prior relationship or history of safely managing such information.[111] In certain contexts, some humanitarian actors also choose not to share information with peacekeepers on principle because the Missions have armed components or because humanitarians consider the Missions to be parties to the conflict.[112] In these cases, humanitarians may choose to only share information with the Mission's Human Rights Division, as HRDs are a part of OHCHR as well as the Mission.

Additional capacity in the GBV sub-cluster or a coordination body like UN OCHA could help strengthen information-sharing between peacekeepers and humanitarians on CRSV and ensure that it is done safely.[113] This additional capacity could be used to: improve implementation of common data-collection templates and methodologies; carry out regular training for NGO personnel and peacekeeping officials on existing information-sharing guidelines and ISPs; and support other types of engagement and relationship building that are prerequisites for sensitive data sharing.

Moreover, because much of the success of the MARA meetings has been due to the strong leadership of individual SWPAs, Mission leaders will need to ensure that progress establishing and improving MARA meetings does not dissipate with staff turnover. Peacekeeping officials who spoke with CIVIC also cautioned against relying on the MARA as an early-warning mechanism. While it can help inform leadership decision-making and orient humanitarian programming, it cannot serve as a mission's primary early warning tool on CRSV because it only occurs once per month.[114] Additionally, the framework for the MARA requires more detailed investigation and verification of cases, which cannot be carried out for every alert and can cause delays in reporting.[115] Missions need to ensure that their primary early-warning mechanisms outside the MARA include indicators for and analysis of CRSV.

The Role of JOCs and Databases in Organizing and Analyzing CRSV Data

Joint Operations Centers (JOCs) and their field-based counterparts play an important role in integrating reporting from all other sections into mission-wide daily and weekly situation reports. Not only can this integrated reporting help create a common operating picture for the Missions, the data compiled by JOCs is reviewed in weekly meetings that are used to coordinate section activities and action. JOCs can therefore play an important role in working with other sections to ensure reporting on CRSV is verified, included in summary situation reports, and highlighted during operational discussions.

However, the Missions still rely heavily on narrative reporting, which can complicate the efforts of JOCs to track and analyze CRSV. Databases can aid in tracking incidents of CRSV, looking at trends in the occurrence of sexual violence, and analyzing patterns of harm committed by different perpetrators. The primary database for doing this work is the Situational Awareness Geospatial Enterprise (SAGE), an incident tracking system that has been deployed to all three Missions and is managed by the JOCs.[116] Peacekeepers who spoke with CIVIC relayed that SAGE can contribute to the gender sensitivity of analysis if there is strong mission buy-in for the

database, it is widely used, and data-entry forms are tailored to include gender. In MONUSCO, for example, POC advisors, Human Rights Officers, and Women Protection Advisors in the Mission were consulted on how to revise data entry forms to improve the system when SAGE was first being deployed. As a result, gender was made a mandatory field so that it must be specified each time an incident is entered in the database. Before this revision, most incidents entered into SAGE did not include the gender of the perpetrator or the survivor. Now the majority do.[117] Commenting on this shift, one MONUSCO official said, "With SAGE, we are trying to actively collect the data, rather than just take what we can get. As a result, our reporting is much more gender sensitive…it becomes routine."[118] The increase in sex-disaggregated data and the ability of staff to analyze patterns of violence in SAGE has collectively allowed JOC personnel to include more gender-sensitive analysis in their briefings and to share data on patterns.[119] "The daily brief that the JOC produces for the SRSG, you will find that they are now including a gender perspective," concluded one MONUSCO civilian official.[120]

Beyond MONUSCO, however, use of SAGE has been less institutionalized. Some peacekeepers in MINUSCA expressed appreciation for SAGE and its ability to allow better and more gender-sensitive analysis.[121] Yet at the time of CIVIC's research, MINUSCA officials reported that SAGE was still not uniformly or widely used for incident tracking and analysis in the Mission. Moreover, staff were maintaining parallel processes and methods for tracking CRSV, which can be inefficient.[122] Staff cited low confidence in the quality control of data and a lack of universal access to the database as reasons why staff maintain parallel systems for tracking.[123] UNMISS faces a similar dilemma. The UNMISS JOC has made repeated efforts to build buy-in for SAGE and train staff on its use, but staff have not widely adopted the platform. They continue to utilize other databases as their primary incident tracking mechanisms.[124] For example, the Human Rights Division in UNMISS has taken on a larger role in casualty tracking. To do so, they created a new database alongside SAGE and their existing OHCHR database that allows them to more readily analyze CRSV threats and disaggregate protection threats by gender. Military and civilian personnel in the Mission who rely on this new system's data voiced strong appreciation for the HRD's efforts to better analyze violence against civilians and felt they are helping drive an improved understanding of CRSV hotspots.[125] However, the incidents in these parallel databases need to be integrated into SAGE by the JOC or the sections who record them to avoid confusion and ensure the Missions have a common operating picture and understanding of threats for decision-making.

Missions with parallel databases should work with the UN Operations and Crisis Center (OCC) in New York to determine whether adjustments can be made to SAGE to improve its functionality for different Mission stakeholders or to allow data to be imported from one database to another. Mission leadership are ultimately responsible for ensuring peacekeeping operations have the information they need to operate effectively, and Special Representatives to the Secretary-General (SRSGs) should ensure that either information on CRSV and other threats is being effectively integrated through the adoption of a common incident tracking database or that all tracking tools are ultimately reconciled by data-entry focal points and the JOC. Finally, mission personnel must recognize that while SAGE is an important tool, data will only contribute to more gender-sensitive analysis of violence—including CRSV—if peacekeepers use it for this purpose. JOCs and other Mission officials need to initiate this analysis and ensure they are reporting on it in weekly meetings. Mission leadership should require staff to do so.

Gendered Analysis from JMACs

Joint Mission Analysis Centers (JMACs) are the primary entity within missions responsible for conducting analysis to inform leadership decision-making. CIVIC's research found that JMACs are attempting to better incorporate gender into the analysis they provide to Mission leadership, and personnel generally reported improvements in the frequency with which gender-related concerns are included in their analysis.[126] However, progress across the Missions has not been equal.[127] MONUSCO stood out as having made the most progress.[128]

MONUSCO personnel explained to CIVIC that the Mission's JMAC has created more structure in the analytical process, including by asking analysts to compile questions before reaching out to contacts so that they can be reviewed by team leaders to ensure aspects of gender have been included. Team leaders and gender focal points also review conflict analysis to check whether a gender dimension is included.[129] "They definitely analyze the sexual violence systematically," observed one MONUSCO civilian official.[130]

Despite this progress, JMACs' efforts to incorporate gender into Mission analysis appear to have lagged behind gender mainstreaming in some other sections, such as Political Affairs and Civil Affairs, where teams do more programmatic work.[131] CIVIC identified a number of interrelated reasons for this sometimes slow and uneven progress. As noted, JMACs use information provided by other sections as the foundation for much of their analysis. As a result, their ability to conduct a gender-sensitive analysis can be constrained. "I think if we got the right data from the source, in terms of analysis, we wouldn't have a problem," asserted one MINUSCA official.[132] As other Mission sections increasingly report sex-disaggregated data and information on CRSV, it will be easier for JMACs to regularly provide gendered analysis of conflict dynamics.

In conversations with CIVIC, some Mission officials justified the limited incorporation of gender into JMAC analysis by explaining that the role of JMAC is focused primarily on analyzing the capabilities of armed groups to cause harm, while other Mission entities are responsible for analyzing the impact of armed groups on civilians.[133] It is true that, at times, Human Rights Officers, Protection Advisors, and WPAs are better placed to conduct gendered analysis of protection threats. However, because the Missions

> ***"Gender analysis tends to be about women and we are losing men and the pressures on young men. ...We are missing entry points by not dealing with masculinities."***
>
> ***— UNMISS civilian official***

are not always able to launch timely human rights investigations and because Mission leadership relies so heavily on JMAC analysis for decision-making, it is important that these sections collaborate and that gender analysis is shared and included in the JMAC's products. The heads of JMACs should also ensure that the early warning indicators tracked by JMACs include specific warning signs of CRSV. Moreover, JMACs should ensure that their analysis of armed groups includes gendered analysis, such as the gendered dimensions of recruitment. As one UNMISS civilian official reflected, "Where I think we sometimes lose it in South Sudan is that gender analysis tends to be about women and we are losing men and the pressures on young men. ...We are missing entry points by not dealing with masculinities."[134] Mission officials also suggested that more in-depth training for all JMAC analysts, not just the section's gender focal points, would help improve gendered analysis.[135]



October 11, 2018. *MINUSCA supports an agricultural project for at-risk youth in Birao, Central African Republic. Such conflict violence reduction programming often targets ex-combatants, youth at risk of recruitment, and other community members in hotspot locations of the country.*

VI. INTEGRATED PLANNING AND RESPONSE TO CRSV

"Making sure these [gender] considerations are mainstreamed in Force activities, that is a challenge."[136]

"From political engagement to preventative patrols and mentoring of police, we are able to do something [on CRSV]."[137]

Peacekeeping missions protect civilians through three tiers of activities: protection through dialogue and engagement (Tier I); provision of physical protection (Tier II); and establishing a protective environment (Tier III). There are activities that peacekeeping missions can and do perform in all three tiers that help address CRSV. However, some activities intended to address CRSV do not fall neatly into one tier versus another, and, similarly, an activity that can be categorized under one tier may be closely linked to an activity falling under a separate tier.

Under Tier I, for example, missions engage in dialogue with potential perpetrators of violence to discourage and prevent CRSV; they apply political pressure on governments and national security forces to better protect civilians from CRSV;

they investigate CRSV violations, and document them through the MARA and public reporting; they support radio programming and events aimed at sensitizing people to women's rights and laws against SGBV; and they lead dialogues to address intercommunal violence or transhumance that has resulted in CRSV.

Under Tier II, missions can carry out military patrols or operations to prevent and respond to suspected or ongoing cases of CRSV; they can jointly monitor and respond to SGBV alerts with national police officers (through UNPOL officers); they can conduct political engagement to prevent or interrupt imminent and ongoing violence; and they can advocate for the release of men and women being held in sexual slavery.

Tier III activities to address CRSV include supporting the establishment of national action plans against CRSV; carrying out advocacy and political engagement with national institutions on legal reforms; increasing the capacity of national actors to prevent and respond to CRSV through training; combatting impunity for CRSV by supporting prosecution of perpetrators; and ensuring CRSV is addressed through political processes and that survivors are empowered to participate in these processes.

One mission component or section cannot effectively implement any of these activities alone. Police, military, and civilian peacekeepers collectively contribute to each of these activities, which means that a mission needs early warning, consultation, and planning mechanisms that ensure CRSV prevention and response are coordinated across the mission. When existing coordination mechanisms for protection analysis and planning are strong, peacekeeping missions can use these forums to coordinate action on CRSV. However, many missions have very limited strategic planning capacity and, as a result, can revert to working in silos rather than collectively addressing protection threats, including CRSV. Moreover, CRSV may not be prioritized during broader protection discussions. Therefore, stand-alone coordination mechanisms dedicated to addressing SGBV and CRSV can strengthen the implementation of mandated CRSV tasks.

Monitoring CRSV Violations to Raise Awareness and Combat Impunity

CIVIC interviewed stakeholders in South Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR to assess their views on the work peacekeepers do to monitor CRSV and support justice initiatives that can combat impunity for sexual violence.[138] As already discussed, peacekeeping missions monitor CRSV through the MARA as well as other human rights investigations and reporting. The information collected can be used to support various mission activities, including raising public awareness about CRSV and the rights of women, advocating to influence host state efforts to prevent and respond to CRSV, and strengthening justice to combat impunity.

Among the civil society leaders, civilians, and humanitarian actors that CIVIC interviewed, we found strong support for the monitoring and reporting function that UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA provide.[139] A number of stakeholders in South Sudan told CIVIC that they believe UNMISS's monitoring and investigating of CRSV and other violations has helped contribute to protection of civilians by discouraging such violations.[140] "Those people committing atrocities, they fear that if they do something, it can be reported," explained a civilian in South Sudan.[141] A female civil society leader in the DRC told CIVIC that when SGBV violations are reported to the police, corruption often prevents cases from being properly managed and the identity of survivors is not protected. She emphasized how important MONUSCO's monitoring role is in the face of this corruption, saying, "Without MONUSCO, it would be chaos."[142]

Other stakeholders stressed the importance of public reporting on violations.[143] A civil society leader in South Sudan explained that public reporting by UNMISS creates advocacy opportunities because it gets international attention that reporting from national organizations does not. "They [UNMISS] are the ones who come out and tell the whole world that women were raped," she said.[144] However, CIVIC's interlocutors stressed a need for peacekeepers to do more political engagement and advocacy to translate the findings of human rights reports into improved protection and reduced CRSV.[145]

> ***CIVIC's interlocutors stressed a need for peacekeepers to do more political engagement and advocacy to translate the findings of human rights reports into improved protection and reduced CRSV.***

In order to strengthen awareness around CRSV violations, military, police, and civilian peacekeepers collectively carry out trainings and host workshops that help spread awareness about laws governing CRSV. Under specific conditions, Missions may also share the findings of these investigations with military justice officials and prosecutors in the host state to support legal cases against perpetrators—whether they are members of non-state armed groups or of the host nation military itself.

Peacekeepers can also more directly support justice and accountability initiatives by training military and civilian prosecutors and judges, providing logistical assistance for trials, and rehabilitating courts and jails independently or in partnership with development agencies. In some cases, the Missions create or bolster mobile court systems that improve civilian access to justice in the absence of more permanent structures. UNMISS, for example, has helped establish a system of mobile courts that prioritizes cases of SGBV and is one of the only avenues for civilians to access formal justice, especially in remote parts of South Sudan. They have also advocated for the establishment of a special court based in the capital to handle cases of SGBV and juvenile crimes and engaged in targeted training for justice officials on prosecuting CRSV and SGBV.[146] Similarly, MONUSCO supports mobile court hearings and asks that staff aim to have 20 percent of cases involve either a defendant or victim who is a woman. Likewise, a MONUSCO Prosecution Support Cell provides technical, logistical, and financial support for the investigation and prosecution of CRSV crimes as well as other international crimes perpetrated by state security forces and armed groups. Their goal is to have 35 percent of cases they support involve CRSV.[147] From 2016 to 2018, at least 159 members of state security forces were convicted of perpetrating sexual violence crimes, in many cases with the support of MONUSCO.[148] In the CAR, MINUSCA's efforts to encourage national prosecution of CRSV violations have included assistance to the Special Criminal Court and supporting the resumption of criminal sessions by the Court of Appeal.

Stakeholders interviewed by CIVIC expressed an overwhelming need for formal justice mechanisms to hold perpetrators of CRSV accountable, and they expressed support for Mission efforts to bolster trials. In South Sudan, progress toward the establishment of an AU Hybrid Court for South Sudan—as foreseen in the peace agreement—has been slow. Moreover, once established, it will focus only on high-level perpetrators, leaving most cases to be handled by national courts. "Now where is the accountability for all these crimes? There is a lot of rape, all by people in uniform and they are [still] here," observed a South Sudanese civilian.[149] A local South Sudanese government official in an area that has experienced high levels of sexual violence told CIVIC: "UNMISS also need[s] to strengthen the judicial system in South Sudan. We have a lot of cases related to sexual abuse in our local and state prisons, but court rulings have never prevailed [nor] perpetrators [been] held accountable, and we believe that by working closely with the judicial and prison sections, there will be a great difference."[150] While interview participants were enthusiastic about mobile courts, they stressed the need for wider reforms within the judicial system as well as training for justice officials so that courts do not inadvertently create risks for women or reinforce harmful societal practices. As one South Sudanese civil society leader emphasized, "They need to ask themselves 'how engendered are those courts?'"[151]

Finally, stakeholders expressed support for the wider work that these Missions do to raise awareness of the rights and laws that protect men and women from CRSV.[152] "If MINUSCA has a role to play [on CRSV], it is to transform the mentality of people through awareness," said a civil society leader from the CAR.[153] "They taught us how to claim our rights,"

> *"They taught us how to claim our rights"*
>
> *— Congolese civil society leader*

explained a Congolese civil society leader after outlining how MONUSCO had translated relevant laws into Swahili and shared them with national actors.[154] In South Sudan, an official of an inter-governmental body described how, over the years, SGBV has gone from being a taboo subject to one that is much more openly discussed—a change due, in part, to UNMISS's sensitization work. The official said, "the more women who know about it and young girls, the better, and UNMISS has the tools…. It is slowly moving in the right direction. …The biggest measure of progress is that it is being talked about regularly." Civil society leaders also advocated for peacekeeping missions to increase the activities they do to raise awareness of CRSV and, moreover, to ensure that these activities include men as well as women.[155] As a civil society leader from the CAR explained, "There are men who do not want to admit equality between men and women, and they still constitute barriers for us. MINUSCA can help, through sensitizations, to change the mentality of men who continue to minimize women…"[156]

Providing Physical Protection From CRSV

Peacekeeping missions' military and police components play a key role in providing civilians with physical protection from CRSV through short-duration patrols, long-duration patrols, and temporary deployments or operations in high-risk areas. These activities tend to be the most visible action peacekeepers take to protect civilians from CRSV, and are the activities local stakeholders most closely associate with the protection mandate of the Missions. However, there are significant limitations to each Missions' ability to launch physical responses to warnings about CRSV. Most notably, UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA have very limited numbers of troops and police officers that they can deploy across large countries in response to sexual violence. In fact, stakeholders who spoke with CIVIC cited capacity limitations as one of the main factors restricting the Missions' physical response to CRSV.[157] Recognizing that there are overarching constraints, CIVIC assessed whether these Missions, within their limited resources, adequately consider and prioritize CRSV while planning physical protection activities.

Personnel from all three peacekeeping Missions were able to provide CIVIC with examples of operations and temporary deployments initiated in response to CRSV threats. In the DRC, peacekeepers and civil society leaders shared many examples of MONUSCO launching temporary military deployments—referred to as standing combat deployments—in response to concerns about CRSV.[158] MINUSCA has launched fewer operations and deployments to address CRSV or other gender-related protection concerns, with MINUSCA officials able to report launching a mission response to CRSV on one occasion in Nana-Gribizi.[159] However, they explained that, while not directly linked to CRSV, the Mission has made efforts to concentrate their presence in areas where there are IDP camps because they suspect women and children may be particularly vulnerable in these areas. MINUSCA officials also noticed that movement by pastoralists is often linked to sexual violence, so they are beginning to include operations to address this pattern in the Force's broader protection plans.[160] In preparation for upcoming elections, MINUSCA is also creating strategies to protect groups of voters who might be vulnerable to sexual violence.[161]

CIVIC determined that some efforts have also been made in each Mission to link short-duration patrolling to CRSV. Under a new Force Commander, UNMISS, in particular, appears to be emphasizing the need to link short-duration patrolling to CRSV hotspots. UNMISS officials reported that the HRD is working bilaterally with some NGOs to map CRSV hotspots and has identified focal points within the section to receive alerts. These focal points are working closely with the Force to share hotspot information and route patrols to those locations. To demonstrate how this dynamic has improved patrolling, stakeholders provided CIVIC with the example of Bentiu—a town where over 100 women were subjected to sexual violence in the span of a few weeks in November 2018. Despite some potential warning signs that



May 8, 2017. *Mongolian peacekeepers are awarded the United Nations Medal for their commitment and service to the UN and the people of South Sudan during a ceremony in Bentiu. During the ceremony, UNMISS SRSG David Shearer paid particular tribute to the 41 female members of the Mongolian peacekeeping team who make an important contribution to improving communication and engagement with the local community in Bentiu.*

sexual violence was taking place, the Force did not recognize the threat, shift its patrols, or take action to prevent violence during those first weeks. Through the renewed efforts of UNMISS's HRD and troops in Bentiu, patrols have since become more responsive to CRSV.[162] An NGO involved in helping identify hotspots told CIVIC, "In Bentiu, they are working very closely with us, and whenever we have identified people at risk, we have seen them responding to our appeals."[163] UNMISS is also regularly carrying out "firewood patrols" in areas around protection of civilians sites where IDPs are sheltered on UN bases for protection. These regular, timed patrols are intended to create a safe space for women to collect firewood and water outside of the POC sites. While not a consistent or institutionalized practice in MINUSCA, two Mission officials provided CIVIC with isolated examples of patrols being organized to coincide with women gathering firewood, collecting water, or traveling to markets.[164]

When reflecting on the impact of patrols, many civilians at risk of violence told CIVIC that they improve security—including by making CRSV less likely in areas where patrols are carried out.[165] Yet even if patrols are going to the right locations, the poor quality of some patrols and the risk-averse posture among some of the Missions' uniformed components may be undermining their ability to prevent CRSV.[166] While poor road infrastructure and weather can also limit the reach of patrols, many patrols are restricted to areas that can be accessed in UN vehicles because troops are unwilling to conduct foot patrols. Civilians also observed that patrols tend to take place during daylight hours and in urban or semi-urban areas, not on small roads or in residential areas. In short, patrols take place when and where crimes like CRSV are least likely to take place.[167] One South Sudanese civil society leader explained, "The other weakness is the patrol. They seem to be concentrating their patrols in town. People want them to go into those hot hotspots."[168] Echoing this concern, a humanitarian official in South Sudan noted, "It is when the situation calms down that they will go out. It makes no sense. We are expecting them to patrol, to protect women when the situation is serious."[169]

Overall, however, the assessment of many stakeholders was that the Missions are increasingly taking CRSV threats into account when they carry out physical protection activities. According to an UNMISS civilian official, "The gender sensitivity of POC activities on sexual violence, I have seen a positive change. There is more alertness to that."[170] A MONUSCO military official responded similarly when asked about the Mission's physical response to CRSV: "I think the Force has gotten better with early warning indicators and responding to things. ...They are definitely improving and trying to consider POC and the woman aspect."[171] Nonetheless, these efforts to improve CRSV prevention and response are not systematic enough and tend to shift with changes in personnel—slowly improving, but backsliding when key champions depart from the Missions.

The assessment of many stakeholders was that the Missions are increasingly taking CRSV threats into account when they carry out physical protection activities.

As they did when explaining why many troops fail to include incidents of CRSV and sex-disaggregated data in reporting, staff attributed shortcomings in the Force's response to CRSV threats to the fact that most military officials have limited training and exposure to CRSV. In particular, staff stressed that buy-in is required—not only from high-ranking commanders at Mission headquarters, but from sector and battalion commanders in the field, where it is often lacking. As one MINUSCA civilian official summarized, "When it comes to the military, we are not homogeneous, and it might not be obvious for the Force, the gender dimension of operations. ... For the military, it is not automatic."[172] Finally, Mission officials stressed that when gender specialists are working alongside troops and planning happens jointly between military and civilian officials, gender and CRSV are more likely to be considered in operations.

TEXTBOX E: GENDER AND CRSV SPECIALISTS IN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

Ideally, all staff deployed to a peacekeeping mission should have the ability to analyze protection threats through a gendered lens and an understanding of how to incorporate CRSV and broader gender concerns into their conflict analysis. However, the goal of gender mainstreaming is not yet a reality for a variety of reasons that will be discussed in more detail later in this report—including the limited training available to most UN personnel on gender and minimal efforts to incorporate gender skills and awareness into staff hiring and evaluation processes. Until peacekeeping missions prioritize gender in all staffing considerations, the gender and CRSV specialists deployed to peacekeeping missions will remain critically important.[173] These gender and CRSV specialists include Force Gender Advisors and Force gender focal points, SWPAs and WPAs, Gender Affairs Officers, and gender focal points within peacekeeping missions' substantive civilian sections. While each category of gender and CRSV specialist has a unique role within missions, their responsibilities are closely linked. Therefore, coordination and collaboration between these specialists is important.

SWPAs and WPAs

SWPAs and WPAs are civilian experts on CRSV working within missions' HRDs. They track CRSV through the MARA and host information-sharing meetings on CRSV that bring together mission personnel and UN agency protection actors. The analysis done through SWPAs and the MARA Working Groups they chair is one of the best resources available to missions as they determine how to respond to CRSV in an effective way.

Gender Affairs Units

While (S)WPAs focus specifically on CRSV and monitoring external threats, Gender Affairs Units and the Gender Affairs Officers that staff them are mandated to provide technical and operational support on gender equality and the implementation of UNSC resolutions on WPS. They monitor progress on these issues and, as a result, Gender Affairs Units are more broadly concerned with SGBV and tend to focus on gender mainstreaming internally.

Civilian Gender Focal Points

Although invaluable, WPAs and Gender Advisors are few in number and have limited capacity. To help facilitate gender mainstreaming within staffing and budgetary constraints, peacekeeping missions have adopted a system wherein at least one staff member in each substantive civilian section of a peacekeeping mission is supposed to be designated as a gender focal point on top of their regular duties. CIVIC found that—with a few notable exceptions—focal points were in place in the substantive civilian sections of UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA at the headquarters level.[174] Within these Missions, they are significantly contributing to the gender sensitivity of operations by ensuring gender is incorporated into section work plans, monitoring and reporting on gender-specific indicators, conducting gendered analysis for section heads, and sharing information on gender across sections.[175] While a less widespread practice, the Missions also sometimes appoint protection focal points or women protection focal points in field locations. Usually located within the Human Rights Division, these focal points can pay special attention to CRSV and gendered threats to civilians that might not be the focus of other peacekeepers or sections.[176]

Civilian gender focal points receive more in-depth training on gender from the Gender Affairs Unit than other peacekeepers. Most focal points who spoke with CIVIC felt that this training was sufficient for their roles.[177] However, a number of gender focal points noted that trainings are general and don't provide guidance in their particular thematic areas of work.[178] "They could give us more specific guidance for

every division. ...It can be hard to apply it [guidance] concretely," explained one MINUSCA gender focal point.[179] To address this issue, the Missions could consider embedding Gender Advisors within different substantive sections for limited periods of time. Where Gender Affairs Units lack the capacity or skillset to provide such support, this gap could be addressed through additional remote mentorship or training provided by UN headquarters staff in New York and Geneva; digital forums that allow gender focal points to connect to their counterpoints in other missions and learn from their experience; and efforts by the UN to compile lessons learned on gender mainstreaming in different thematic peacekeeping areas, such as the recent UN DPO consultation on gender sensitivity in security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).[180]

Mission personnel shared a number of other lessons on how to ensure that civilian gender focal points are effective. For example, Missions are assigning alternate or tandem gender focal points to safeguard against gaps in the gender focal point role or loss of knowledge due to staff turnover.[181] According to personnel, civilian gender focal points are also most useful when they are higher-ranking members of their sections.[182] "Part of the problem, sometimes, [with] the gender focal points, they're not high enough up the hierarchy to do battle with some of the people who are not very good at this," remarked one MONUSCO civilian official.[183] Guidance or directives from Mission leadership can instruct section heads to elevate gender focal point roles to higher-level posts.

Force Gender Advisors and Focal Points

UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA all have one or two full-time military officers serving as Force Gender Advisors in their headquarters. These Force Gender Advisors are tasked with a broad mandate on gender that encompasses Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), gender parity, and protection of civilians from SGBV. They are invaluable because they serve as a bridge between civilian and military personnel and are able to translate analysis and recommendations from civilian sections into military action. As one UNMISS official observed, Force Gender Advisors can be particularly effective at mobilizing a physical response to CRSV hotspots because they are "another person in uniform talking instead of a civilian talking."[184] Speaking about the Force Gender Advisor, a MONUSCO civilian official similarly noted, "She is trying to translate all these tools into Force tools and institutionalize it so that it is more sustainable."[185]

However, because Force Gender Advisors have such a broad mandate, they cannot devote equal attention to all of their mandated roles. As a result, they often perform very different functions from one Mission to another depending on their skillset and the preferences of their commanding officers. Their broad mandate and the lack of standardization in their role can result in Force Gender Advisors deprioritizing CRSV. As one MONUSCO military official observed, they "cover too many things, from gender parity to sometimes getting involved in SEA rather than the protection of civilians angle, and more the implementation of the WPS mandate."[186] At the time of CIVIC's research, for instance, MINUSCA's Force Gender Advisor was primarily focused on training and monitoring for SEA and was not regularly involved in the Force's operational planning.[187] By contrast, several peacekeepers told CIVIC that the Force Gender Advisor in MONUSCO has been incorporated into the planning cell of the Force and, with the support of her superiors, was able to influence most Force briefings and operations.[188] While neither focus is inherently better, having the Force Gender Advisor embedded in Mission planning is ideal for ensuring that Missions effectively combat CRSV.

CIVIC identified several other factors that influence the effectiveness of Force Gender Advisors. Notably, Force Gender Advisors are often deployed to missions for short, six- to nine-month rotations and have little to no overlap with their predecessors. Both of these factors undermine their impact on

operations.[189] "We have requested several times that the periods of deployment for the Force Gender Advisor are extended because six months is too short. ...There are other posts seconded and for longer, so why not this one?" asked a MONUSCO civilian official.[190]

Like in civilian sections, a system of Force gender focal points has also been created to help mainstream gender into each Missions' military component without creating additional demands on Mission posts and resources. At the time of CIVIC's research, MONUSCO and UNMISS had small numbers of military gender focal points operating in the capital or at the Missions' military headquarters, but none in field locations.[191] MINUSCA had recently trained a large number of military gender focal points and deployed them out to the sector and battalion levels.[192] While peacekeepers stressed the importance of having Force gender focal points at the field level, it is not clear whether Force Gender Advisors—who are already capacity strapped—will be able to regularly engage and mentor focal points in field locations. Moreover, peacekeepers told CIVIC that military gender focal points are over-tasked and not able to devote adequate attention to gender-related tasks.[193] Without regular engagement, focal points may have minimal impact. "They are doing it [gender] maybe 5 percent because they have another job. ...It has got to be full time if you want the person to actually do the work."[194] Peacekeepers agreed that their Missions' military components would benefit greatly from having full-time Force Gender Advisors or Deputy Force Gender Advisors at the sector level. These additional posts would not require an increase in the overall troop ceiling or Mission budgets if existing positions at the headquarters or sector level were replaced with Force Gender Advisor and Deputy Force Gender Advisor posts.

While CRSV increasingly appears to be a consideration during operations, civilian, military, and police leaders in UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA need to ensure that gender is more systematically included during their planning for physical protection activities. Military leaders at headquarters and in field locations should ensure that the intent of patrols is clear, particularly when there is a concern that CRSV is taking place, and the Missions should improve their monitoring of patrols to check that they are responsive to CRSV hotspots and carried out in a more effective manner. Finally, gender and CRSV specialists are an important resource and should be included in planning conversations.

...gender and CRSV specialists are an important resource and should be included in planning conversations.

Building the Capacity of National Actors to Prevent and Respond to CRSV

Peacekeeping missions are temporary deployments intended to protect civilians and promote stability while countries are experiencing or recovering from violent conflict. To guard against peacekeeping missions becoming permanent fixtures in these countries, missions are often asked to develop exit strategies and make sure their activities are sustainable. Paving the way for their own exit usually entails, among other governance activities, building the capacity of national security actor to protect civilians from CRSV so that peacekeepers no longer have to do so themselves. For example, UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA support the development of national action plans against CRSV, assist national legislators in amending laws on CRSV and women's rights to align them with international standards, and apply political pressure for the reform of rule of law and security sectors.

Additionally, UNPOL officers—with the support of Human Rights Officers and WPAs—often work directly with national police officers to train and improve their capacity to handle cases of SGBV. For example, in coordination with the UN Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict, MINUSCA has supported the training and development of a Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Eradication of Sexual Violence Against Women and Children (UMIRR). This unit includes national police officers, gendarmerie, and personnel from the Ministries of Justice, Health, and Social Affairs. Similarly, UNMISS's police component supports the capacity of a Special Protection Unit in the South Sudan National Police Service that handles SGBV and juvenile crimes. In the DRC, MONUSCO UNPOL and Human Rights Officers have supported the establishment of toll-free lines and 24/7 call centers for civilians to report SGBV, including CRSV, to the national police.[195]

Many stakeholders who spoke with CIVIC underlined the importance of peacekeepers contributing to national actors' capacity to address CRSV. They also emphasized that technical support should be accompanied by political engagement with and pressure on national government and security force stakeholders for reform. In South Sudan and the DRC, capacity building of national actors is important partly because peacekeepers are present in relatively few towns and cities. Across the rest of these host countries, survivors of CRSV must often rely on national police officers to handle violations—regardless of how ill-equipped they might be to do so.

Peacekeeping missions are well placed to support the capacity of host nations to fulfill their critical responsibility of protecting civilians from CRSV because they have both the political mandate and technical expertise among their staff to address this issue. In the CAR, for example, where the February 2019 peace agreement signed between the government and 14 armed groups calls for a cessation of all forms of sexual and gender-based violence, MINUSCA's activities related to monitoring and promoting the agreement's implementation have included supporting national committees throughout the country to report any violations. It has made a concerted effort to ensure that women are included in these committees and that the committees identify CRSV violations.[196]

> *Many stakeholders who spoke with CIVIC underlined the importance of peacekeepers contributing to national actors' capacity to address CRSV.*

Some stakeholders shared anecdotal evidence with CIVIC about the impact peacekeepers have had on the capacity of host nations to address CRSV, including through political encouragement to adopt laws against CRSV and by assisting with their drafting, review, and implementation. However, a number of interlocutors stressed that the impact

on the overall performance of security forces has been limited due to weak governance, low levels of women in host nation security sectors, entrenched corruption, and the sheer scale of the reforms that would be needed to overcome these systemic gaps. For example, UNPOL officers can train national police officers in specialized units that are intended to address CRSV, but missions may not be able to address entrenched corruption in how these officers handle cases. In addition, they may have little control over how the units are managed or deployed. The capacity-building efforts of peacekeeping missions should be accompanied by and coordinated with other international efforts—including political engagement and pressure from Member States—to support training, rule of law, and security sector reforms that can effectively reduce CRSV.



UN Photo/Isaac Billy

December 11, 2018. *A mobile court supported by UNMISS is opened in Bentiu on December 11, 2018 to try cases of crimes committed inside and outside the Mission's Protection of Civilians site (POC).*

TEXTBOX F: UNMISS'S LAYERED ENGAGEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION SECURITY ACTORS ON CRSV

In South Sudan, UNMISS has engaged with government and opposition actors at multiple levels to support reforms in how they respond to CRSV. In terms of the host state, UNMISS and the O-SRSG SVC initially encouraged the government to adopt a Joint Communiqué on addressing CRSV and to create a national action plan for implementing the framework outlined in it. Plans were eventually adopted for both the national army and the national police.[197]

Today, UNMISS and the O-SRSG SVC are both providing technical support and applying pressure for the implementation of these plans, including provisions relevant to accountability for CRSV. For example, UNMISS's Rule of Law Advisory Section has supported the national military in developing "Five Key Messages to Prevent Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence," and printing these messages on pocket cards in Arabic and English so they can be disseminated to national security actors.[198] UNMISS has also engaged with both government and opposition security forces in an attempt to secure commitments that they will restrain their troops from perpetrating CRSV. In February 2019, UNMISS managed to secure a command order prohibiting CRSV from the country's primary opposition leader—Riek Machar—as well as internal investigations into the behavior of his Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLA-iO) in Western Equatoria.[199] In February 2020, following these investigations, over 100 abducted women and girls being held in sexual slavery were released.[200] Moreover, in 2019, Thomas Cirillo—the leader of the National Salvation Front (NAS) opposition group—issued statements and directives condemning sexual violence following engagement by UNMISS.[201] At the local level, UNMISS also regularly advocates for the release of civilian women and men abducted by both government and opposition forces.[202]

In addition, UNMISS supports civil-military dialogues during which staff train government and opposition security forces on international law and bring them together with community members to discuss the impact of their operations on civilians—including how violations like CRSV are affecting the community. CIVIC evaluated the impact of these activities in Yei, an area of Central Equatoria where sexual violence perpetrated by uniformed soldiers remains one of the primary security concerns facing civilians. According to stakeholders, these civil-military dialogues are contributing to an improvement in the behavior of security forces.[203]

As discussed in Textbox F, UNMISS officials have engaged with opposition actors as well as government officials to obtain commitments on reducing or eliminating CRSV. During CIVIC's research, we spoke with several MONUSCO and MINUSCA officials who also described engaging with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to discourage CRSV and secure commitments against it.[204] However, our research in the DRC and the CAR did not cover the Missions' engagement with NSAGs in detail.

Finally, peacekeeping missions need to ensure that their support for host nation security forces does not cause more harm than good. Host nation security forces in countries where peacekeeping missions are deployed are themselves often responsible for significant levels of CRSV, among other violations. Therefore, when peacekeeping missions provide host nation security forces with fuel, food, or logistical support for operations, they risk inadvertently supporting operations during

which national security forces perpetrate CRSV. One way that missions can safeguard against harm, including CRSV, is through a robust implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). The HRDDP is a UN-wide policy requiring that all UN entities providing support to non-UN security forces assess the risk of those security forces committing violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. Where such risk exists, the UN entity providing support must either take steps to mitigate the risk or withdraw support.[205]

Adopting a Coordinated Approach for Addressing CRSV

Because of their multidimensional structure, peacekeeping missions are a unique tool for addressing conflict and instability. While their multidimensional setup can be an asset, police, military, and civilian personnel often have very different training and methods of working. Missions need strong coordination structures to bring these components together and ensure they respond to protection threats cohesively. As a MINUSCA military official emphasized, "A military operation itself is not useful if there is nothing before or after. That is why it has to be embedded in the overall strategy of the Mission."[206]

Most peacekeeping missions lack adequate coordination mechanisms and staff to harmonize their protection responses. For example, Strategic Planning Units are usually too understaffed and overtasked to regularly lead planning forums.[207] Likewise, Heads of Missions and Heads of Field Offices struggle to divide their time between high-level political engagement and staff management. Missions have a variety of meetings intended to discuss protection threats and mission responses—such as weekly JOC meetings, early warning meetings, Protection Working Group (PWG) meetings, Senior Management Groups on Protection (SMG-P), and Senior Leadership Team (SLT) meetings. Some of these meetings are high-level decision-making forums with a relatively small membership. Others are more inclusive, but they tend to lack consistent attendance and often don't result in clear decisions or actions.[208]

Without proper management, these complicated structures can undermine coordination for all protection activities and make it difficult to ensure CRSV is included substantively in early warning discussion. There is a heightened risk that CRSV will be overlooked in discussions on protection because, as highlighted throughout this paper, levels of training and understanding of CRSV among staff are low, and CRSV can be less visible and less reported than other types of threats.

In conversations with CIVIC, stakeholders across all three country contexts shared examples of coordinated Mission responses to CRSV threats. However, these were isolated cases rather than examples of regular Mission functions. Interlocutors remarked on the need for stronger coordination internally among Mission sections and externally with humanitarian and development actors. In MINUSCA and MONUSCO, MARA meetings are the only forum to specifically focus on CRSV, and while these meetings can provide analysis for planning, they do not necessarily have the right membership for decision-making and planning to take place during the meetings. Information has to flow from MARA meetings into other forums like PWGs, SMG-Ps, or SMTs for action to be taken, and, even then, planning can be siloed.

Nevertheless, at the time of CIVIC's research, a number of MONUSCO officials observed that strong collaboration between the WPAs and POC advisors was enabling better coordination than in the past. In one instance, the SWPA played a key role in supporting collaboration that led to a comprehensive and joint action plan to address CRSV in the Shabunda territory of South Kivu. The action plan, which is explored in more detail in Textbox G, involved activities across all three Mission components as well as a number of humanitarian sectors. At the time of CIVIC's research, action plans against CRSV were in the early stages of development in other locations as well.[209]

In South Sudan, UNMISS's Rule of Law Advisory Unit led the development of a Mission-wide SGBV strategy that established a Task Force on SGBV to promote more coordinated action among Mission officials and several INGOs working on SGBV prevention and response. "We were doing lots



MONUSCO/Taimoor

March 7, 2016. *MONUSCO carries out an aerial surveillance mission in the remote territory of Shabunda, South Kivu Province.*

of stuff, but not as strategically as I would like," explained a civilian Mission official commenting on the situation before the task force was created.[210] An UNMISS police official echoed this sentiment: "There were findings that so many different stakeholders and counterparts were working toward the same goal, and it's about coordination of activities and avoiding doing the same thing at the same time."[211] Although CIVIC's research was carried out while this forum was still too new to assess its impact—the core group of forum members had only met twice—most interlocutors felt it was a positive step toward improving coordination. Officials were hopeful that the task force would improve coordination on CRSV, but emphasized that, to be successful, it should meet more frequently and balance buy-in from high-level Mission officials with guidance from the Mission's gender experts.[212]

Action plans and task forces on CRSV and SGBV are two tools missions can use to overcome weaknesses in their coordination structures. In their budgets, UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA should also continue to prioritize staffing positions at Mission headquarters and in field locations that focus on strategic planning and coordination. They also need to ensure that coordinated planning is based on analysis of available data. To this end, a new initiative called the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System (CPAS) is currently being rolled out in each of the Missions. It is intended to overhaul how impact is measured and ensure that impact data is used to refocus Mission activities and strategic planning. Because MINUSCA piloted CPAS, it is further along in its implementation than UNMISS and MONUSCO. A MINUSCA civilian official told CIVIC that the system "has lots of potential for gender mainstreaming and helping us incorporate context-based analysis into a strategic plan." According to this official, planning without CPAS can be superficial—just "someone going in and adding to [a strategy], the word 'gender' or 'women'."[213]

TEXTBOX G: MONUSCO'S ACTION PLAN AGAINST CRSV IN SHABUNDA

In 2018, a faction of the Raia Mutomboki armed group was responsible for an upsurge of CRSV in the Shabunda, Walunga, and Mwenga territories of South Kivu, an area rich in mineral resources. The group subjected hundreds of women, girls, and men to sexual violence in a series of attacks. Shabunda is a remote area. There is no regular INGO or MONUSCO presence in the area, and the lack of road infrastructure makes it difficult to access. While humanitarians and Mission officials were alerted to the violence, it was not easy for them to mount a quick response. However, WPAs and Human Rights Officers conducted investigation missions in Shabunda, and JMAC officials and the SWPA collaborated to conduct a thorough analysis of the conflict and threat dynamics in the area.[214] With the support of the SWPA and WPA unit, MONUSCO's regional office then developed a comprehensive action plan through the SMGP-P forum to respond to the sexual violence. The plan was endorsed by MONUSCO's SRSG.

In consultation with international and national humanitarian actors and provincial authorities, MONUSCO created a detailed work plan with activities for different stakeholders to perform along a staggered timeline. For example, the Force was asked to establish a temporary base from which it could dominate the area with patrols and support the activities of the Mission's civilian component. Civil Affairs began to establish an early warning network,[215] and other officials trained Congolese military and police officials deployed in the area to improve their response to CRSV. In addition, MONUSCO supported judicial investigations and the prosecution of the Raia Mutomboki faction commander responsible for CRSV and other serious human rights abuses and two of his combatants.[216] Moreover, MONUSCO worked with the Panzi hospital to facilitate the travel of Congolese doctors to Shabunda, where they provided specialized treatment to survivors of sexual violence.[217]

As a result of the implementation of the action plan, the Raia Mutomboki faction leader, Kokodikoko, was captured by the Congolese army, tried, and convicted for crimes against humanity and other abuses committed in Shabunda.[218] The court also found the state responsible for failing in its obligations to protect civilians, including from crimes of sexual violence. In the wake of the action plan's first phase, there was also a 72 percent decrease in CRSV in the area.[219] "We managed to mobilize the whole of MONUSCO for one reason, and it was CRSV [focused]," explained a MONUSCO civilian official.[220] A second civilian official emphasized that "all sections of MONUSCO were doing what they could to improve protection in that area."[221] A humanitarian actor described Shabunda as "one of the areas where, there has been impact, and where they've really moved out to try and do more."[222]

VII. PRIORITIZING GENDER AND CRSV THROUGH LEADERSHIP, GUIDANCE, AND TRAINING

"We have been reaching out to leadership because accountability lies primarily with leadership."[223]

"WPS is one of the core tasks in the mandate and we have to report on it. For us, this helps a lot."[224]

So far, this report has focused in detail on how UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA incorporate CRSV threats into their cycles of information collection, analysis, planning, prevention, and response. While these are the systems and processes that most immediately determine whether missions are responsive to CRSV threats, there are a number of overarching factors that can have an impact on whether a mission prioritizes protection of civilians from CRSV. Language on gender and CRSV in mission mandates and other strategic documents signals the issue's importance to personnel, for example, as does regular attention from a mission's leadership. Incorporating CRSV into accountability mechanisms can ensure that officials are held responsible for their reaction to CRSV threats, while training can empower them with the skills to respond effectively. Missions, Member States, and the UNSC need to collectively ensure that the right guidance, training, funding, and accountability mechanisms are in place for missions to fulfill the CRSV roles they are mandated to perform.

Incorporating Gender and CRSV into Strategic Documents

Stakeholders who met with CIVIC stressed that responsiveness to CRSV starts with a mission's mandate.[225] CIVIC analysis of the UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA mandates over the last five years shows that language on CRSV has remained relatively constant for MONUSCO and MINUSCA while increasing significantly for UNMISS. Today, CRSV features prominently in all three mandates.[226] In meetings with CIVIC, staff emphasized the link between mandate language and the prioritization of CRSV in Mission activities. "Because it is in the mandate, everyone is doing GBV," said an UNMISS civilian official.[227] A MINUSCA official likewise noted, "We have in the back of our minds always the Security Council resolutions."[228] Several Mission officials further observed that the degree to which CRSV is prioritized in Mission responses is influenced both by the prominence of CRSV in the mandate relative to other tasks and whether CRSV is specifically referenced as a component of Mission tasks.[229] Notably, the Secretary-General has included the need for Member States to streamline and simplify mission mandates as part of his Action for Peacekeeping reform initiative—a change that many peacekeeping experts agree is needed.[230] If Member States do make a concerted effort to streamline mandates and the texts have fewer references to CRSV as a result, the UNSC should still ensure that CRSV maintains relative prominence in its mandates and that personnel are explicitly tasked to respond to CRSV.

Guidance issued by UN entities can also provide vital direction to missions on how to prioritize CRSV and ensure that analysis is gender sensitive. For example, CIVIC found that MINUSCA's Gender Affairs Unit is effectively using UN-wide guidance to help staff understand and implement gender mainstreaming.[231] The 2020 UN Policy and Handbook for UN Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to CRSV were released toward the end of CIVIC's research for this report, so CIVIC was unable to fully assess how they will be used and whether they will affect the performance of UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA on CRSV.

However, a number of peacekeepers told CIVIC they were hopeful the new guidance documents would improve response.[232] Speaking about the Policy, one MINUSCA official stated, "For the first time we have leverage to mainstream these [CRSV] concerns into all of the Mission. ...We have leverage now to say, 'you have to do these things.'"[233] The UN Secretariat should promptly translate the Policy and Handbook into the six official languages of the UN so that missions, TCCs, and PCCs operating in different languages can operationalize them. With assistance and funding from Member States, the Secretariat should also ensure that they are widely distributed to and understood by mission personnel.

In addition to mission mandates and UN-wide guidance, CIVIC found that language on CRSV is also incorporated into a variety of Mission-level strategy documents, including SRSG directives, Force Concepts of Operations, and Force Commander fragmented orders. Yet personnel are not always aware of the specific guidance contained in these policies. For example, UNMISS's Force Operations Order directs military personnel to consider gender perspectives in the planning and conduct of all operations and instructs Sector Commanders to focus on SGBV in their responses.[234] Gender and CRSV are likewise included in different types of military guidance within MONUSCO.[235] However, peacekeepers observed that awareness of this guidance is low and that documents are not well organized, which means that if directives are not updated or re-issued frequently, personnel are often unaware of their existence.[236] CIVIC found that, overall, strategic documents and directives tend to place more emphasis on gender parity and SEA than they do on protection of civilians from CRSV or ensuring mission analysis is gendered.

Of the three Missions under review, only UNMISS had a Mission-wide strategy in place on SGBV.

Missions need to build a coherent set of directives for staff on CRSV—from the strategic down to the operational and tactical levels—and ensure that staff are properly sensitized to guiding documents.

A mission-wide strategy is not necessarily the only or best way for peacekeeping operations to ensure they are addressing CRSV. Missions can struggle to translate high-level mission-wide strategies into action, and having too many parallel strategies can frustrate staff. MINUSCA took a different approach, incorporating CRSV into a wider POC strategy.[237] In the DRC, MONUSCO has focused on location-specific action plans like the one implemented in Shabunda, as well as rolling out toolkits, pocket cards, risk assessments, and threat matrices that incorporate CRSV.[238] While it was beyond CIVIC's ability to fully compare the effectiveness of these different types of guidance documents, our research indicates that the Missions need to build a coherent set of directives for staff on CRSV—from the strategic down to the operational and tactical levels—and ensure that staff are properly sensitized to guiding documents.

TEXTBOX H: SEA, GENDER PARITY, AND PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS FROM CRSV—COMPETING PRIORITIES?

As part of the WPS agenda, peacekeeping missions are not only asked to better protect civilians from CRSV, they are asked to eliminate SEA by peacekeepers and to achieve gender parity by fostering more diversity, inclusivity, and gender balance in UN staffing. These activities should be mutually reinforcing. As already discussed, most stakeholders who spoke with CIVIC agreed that female peacekeepers can more easily engage women about CRSV and other threats.[239] Other research participants explained that improving the gender balance of UN staffing could lead to better gender analysis and responsiveness to CRSV.[240] Moreover, some stakeholders articulated a need for UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA to reduce SEA to be credible actors on CRSV in the eyes of civilians.[241]

While these activities can be mutually reinforcing, the concepts of SEA, gender parity, and gender-sensitive protection of civilians are not interchangeable. Yet it was clear from CIVIC's interviews that a number of peacekeeping officials in these Missions conflate, confuse, or oversimplify the relationship between them.[242] For example, when asked how their Missions are attempting to address CRSV or gender-related protection concerns, a number of peacekeepers referenced initiatives that primarily address gender parity or efforts to reduce SEA. While female peacekeepers can help missions better engage women, they are not necessarily any better trained or better qualified to address CRSV than their male colleagues. One UNMISS civilian official observed, "What we are doing, they call it gender, but it is affirmative action." This official advocated for a refocusing of gender efforts on protection of civilians from CRSV.[243] Confusion may be partly attributed to communication and training: training for the military in some Missions has focused primarily on SEA,[244] while Mission statements, strategies, and indicators have emphasized gender parity more than responsiveness to CRSV.[245] As one UNMISS military official stated, "SEA is strongly educated against and there is a low rate. GBV is under-reported and endemic and there is little accountability."[246] Similarly, a MINUSCA military official reflecting on guidance from the Mission's military leadership observed that "they mention a lot [about] SEA and women in the Force, and the Force with local women. I think those are the two kinds of sexual violence they are focused on."[247]

SEA, gender parity, and protection of civilians from CRSV should not be competing interests. To ensure they are not, Member States and missions need to equally emphasize the importance of these concepts and prioritize all three initiatives in their statements, strategies, monitoring, and reporting.

The Role of Mission Leadership

Understanding how gender influences protection threats and how women, men, girls, and boys are affected by CRSV is essential for peacekeeping missions to mount effective responses to threats where they are deployed. However, many peacekeeping personnel still view incorporating gender-sensitive conflict analysis into their protection work or specifically designing programs to reduce CRSV as extra tasks or burdens.[248] Therefore, it is vital that Mission leadership understand and have an appreciation for the importance of adopting a gender-sensitive approach to protection of civilians. Without support from the top, other personnel are unlikely to prioritize CRSV.



December 8, 2017. *Promotional materials created by the UN to highlight the "no excuses, zero tolerance" approach to sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations personnel.*

Most officials who spoke with CIVIC agreed that gender sensitivity and CRSV are increasingly prioritized by civilian leadership at the highest levels of their Missions—including SRSGs and DSRSGs.[249] To illustrate this commitment, peacekeepers gave examples of SRSGs and DSRSGs regularly asking about CRSV, demanding reporting on CRSV in meetings, and pushing for a Mission response in some serious cases of CRSV. Peacekeepers in MINUSCA and MONUSCO also reported that Senior Women Protection Advisors and the heads of Gender Affairs Units have good and regular access to SRSGs and DSRSGs, which demonstrates their leadership's commitment to gender sensitivity in protection activities.[250] However, SRSGs and DSRSGs have limited capacity and may not always consistently champion Mission responses to CRSV or monitor their Mission's response to CRSV threats.

It is also important for mission leaders in the military component to be aware of and prioritize CRSV. Underscoring this point, a number of peacekeepers interviewed by CIVIC described a large shift in the prioritization of CRSV resulting from the rotation of a Force Commander.[251] Because some military planning and decision-making is delegated to Sector Commanders, their understanding of CRSV can determine whether troops incorporate CRSV hotspot analysis into patrol plans or respond to an early warning alert about sexual violence.[252] Peacekeeping officials shared both positive and negative examples of the influence that Sector

Commanders can have in this regard, but, overall, they stressed that more buy-in is needed for CRSV response at the level of Sector Commanders. Speaking about the unresponsiveness of some Sector Commanders to CRSV, a MONUSCO civilian official told CIVIC, "We struggle as a Mission to get the response that we need in a timely fashion for CRSV."[253]

Lastly, peacekeepers emphasized that for the Missions to regularly and coherently respond to sexual violence, Heads of Field Offices need to prioritize CRSV.[254] Heads of Field Offices can be instrumental in establishing regional plans or strategies to combat CRSV, as well as for ensuring that all sections under their supervision have included it in their individual work plans.

Where CRSV is perpetrated by host nation security forces, the success of local and regional work plans may depend on the coordination of regional efforts with higher-level political engagement. When appointing military, police, and civilian leaders to serve in peacekeeping missions, the UN Secretariat entities responsible for selection should ensure that they consider, among other factors, an individual's understanding of and demonstrated commitment to human rights and addressing CRSV. The induction for high-ranking official should include training on gender and CRSV that goes beyond what is provided to other peacekeeping personnel and such training should be reinforced during annual retreats. Gender mainstreaming and responsiveness to CRSV should be included in SRSG compacts that outline the priorities SRSGs should focus on and against which they will be evaluated.

Accountability for Performance in Response to CRSV

Stakeholders who spoke with CIVIC stressed the importance of accountability in ensuring that a mission's operations and activities are sensitive to gender and prioritize responses to CRSV. A MINUSCA civilian official, for example, stated that "accountability is the only way to mainstream gender."[255] Overall, accountability mechanisms put in place by UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA are not always effective at measuring how operations improve the protection of women, men, girls, and boys from CRSV in the countries where they are deployed. Often, they measure intermediary factors and can fail to drive real prioritization. Speaking about reporting on gender in the DRC, one MONUSCO military official lamented, "We spend a lot of time collecting data that isn't going toward improving protection of civilians."[256] A MINUSCA civilian official discussing the activities of both civilian and uniformed Mission components stated, "We need to measure impact and what these initiatives are contributing to or whether it is box-ticking."[257] Regarding the activities of the civilian component, peacekeepers observed that the participation of women in events is used as a marker of gender sensitivity far too often, when the Missions should be measuring whether programs improve security for women and empower them in ways that might lead to a reduction in CRSV.[258] For the uniformed Mission components, officials underlined the fact that it is not enough to just track the number of patrols performed. Personnel need to track whether and how patrols are linked to threats of CRSV and what specific action is taken by troops or police in response to credible early warning information about CRSV.

Nevertheless, peacekeepers described a gradual improvement in accountability for how gender is considered in Mission activities. Improvements have been driven, in part, by an increased demand for reporting on gender and CRSV from the UNSC and Secretary-General. For example, the UNSC has progressively requested more specific reporting from the Secretary-General on how UNMISS and MONUSCO are mainstreaming gender and protecting civilians from CRSV. For the first time, UNMISS's 2019 mandate included a requirement for the Mission to report on what steps it has taken to deter and prevent SGBV.[259] MONUSCO's mandate now asks that the Secretary-General report on how MONUSCO is "addressing sexual violence and the impact of conflict on women and children using disaggregated data and any gender considerations made."[260]

Other initiatives are pushing missions to ensure that gender is included more systematically in work plans and that all sections are reporting on the

gender sensitivity of their activities. For example, the UN recently established 15 core WPS indicators that all missions are now asked to report against. While these indicators do not focus specifically on CRSV, two of them focus on tracking the broader category of SGBV incidents. Others ask missions to measure the percent of mission planning frameworks informed by a gender analysis and/or gender conflict analysis, as well as the number of "gender responsive operations" carried out by the military and police components.[261] Gender Affairs Units and gender focal points are feeding into and reviewing work plans to ensure gender sensitivity, and they are now compiling data to track the core indicators. "You can see how being hounded for the gender perspective makes a difference in the reporting. ...You see the impact of it," shared one MONUSCO civilian official.[262] Still, while a number of peacekeepers emphasized that demand from New York for reporting can be helpful, the Missions may need to create additional, context-specific indicators to successfully measure Mission activities.

Even before the creation of the 15 core WPS indicators, MONUSCO's SRSG and Gender Affairs Unit established a system of gender markers to evaluate the gender sensitivity of each Mission section. As part of this system's rollout, Gender Affairs Officers worked with sections to help them evaluate how gender could meaningfully be incorporated into their activities and then tracked. The Gender Affairs Officers subsequently set section-specific gender markers with the teams, which included ensuring that sex-disaggregated data was being tracked and that reporting in weekly meetings included gender-sensitive conflict analysis. Summarizing this process, a MONUSCO official observed, "We identified specific entry points on gender that before we didn't have."[263] A unique aspect of this system is that it results in a gender scorecard that is calculated on a quarterly basis and essentially assigns a "grade" to each section. This scorecard can assist the Mission in concretely identifying low performers as well as good practice. Staff told CIVIC that the system of gender markers has helped to reinforce accountability for gender and CRSV and that it has provided concrete examples of progress. Yet holding staff individually accountable for their responsiveness to CRSV remains a challenge.

UN officials in New York and in the Missions themselves have made some efforts to include gender sensitivity in staff evaluations, but there appears to be little oversight or enforcement of this practice.[264]

To promote accountability, Member States should continue mandating missions to regularly report s on how they are incorporating gender into their conflict analysis and protecting women, men, girls, and boys from CRSV. Where these reporting requirements are not already incorporated into mandates—as is the case for MINUSCA—Member States should consider adding such language. The UN Secretariat should also continue to collect data on the 15 core WPS indicators it has established, and it should make this data easily and publicly accessible. Finally, mission officials, in partnership with Secretariat officials, should ensure that staff are regularly evaluated on whether their work adequately incorporates gender-sensitive analysis and CRSV. This information should be considered alongside other performance indicators when making decisions about the retention and promotion of staff.

Training and Staffing

Personnel need training that enables them to identify CRSV and respond effectively to it. Several different trainings on gender and CRSV are currently available to peacekeepers: CRSV is supposed to be included for troops in the pre-deployment training provided by their home countries; all staff receive an overview on gender and CRSV in their in-mission induction training; and civilian staff are required to complete an online course on gender.[265]

As already discussed in Textbox E, gender focal points also receive training on gender beyond what is available to other peacekeeping personnel. Training and capacity building on these issues needs to be improved for all other staff. Although the UN's Integrated Training Service (ITS) has prepared training materials for military personnel that include CRSV, the ITS has limited capacity and is not able to monitor whether training materials are consistently delivered by troop-contributing countries (TCCs) before their troops are deployed. In most cases,

TCCs are the entity responsible for evaluating their own troops before deployment. In-mission induction trainings delivered jointly by Gender Affairs Officers and Women Protection Advisors can help establish a basic understanding of gender and CRSV as concepts, but these topics are usually covered in a one-hour period when personnel are trying to absorb information from a variety of trainings packed into a four- to five-day period. Moreover, UN audits in 2019 found that across all three Missions discussed in this report, very few civilian staff had completed the mandatory online course on gender. In UNMISS, only 5 percent of civilian personnel had completed the course.[266] In MONUSCO and MINUSCA, the numbers were higher at 31 percent and 35 percent, respectively.[267]

Peacekeepers who spoke with CIVIC advocated for additional training for all staff, but identified a particular need for more training for military personnel.[268] Speaking about MINUSCA's troops, a military official in the Mission explained, "It would be helpful at the pre-deployment level to have training on gender. I don't think they are much aware of gender and the value at the tactical and operational level."[269] Likewise, a second MINUSCA military official said, "Sometimes we just hear about gender and POC, but we don't know what it means. …Sexual violence and gender are very important in the Mission, so I think it should be more the focus of training."[270] While troops should deploy to the Missions with a stronger understanding of CRSV, personnel also agreed that additional in-Mission training would be helpful as well. To underline the need for repeated training on gender, a MONUSCO military official compared it to other types of training the military receive: "You don't teach people to shoot once and then assume they know how."[271] Mission officials further stressed that most trainings are delivered in a way that is not conducive to real learning. They advocated for practical, scenario-based training.

While it is clear that additional in-Mission training on gender and CRSV would better equip staff to address CRSV, capacity constraints limit the ability of the Gender Affairs Unit, Women Protection Advisors, and Force Gender Advisors to provide this additional training to peacekeepers who are not serving as gender specialists or focal points. In part, this is because many of the Gender Affairs posts in UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA are lower-level positions that provide support but are limited in what roles they can take on. Women Protection Advisors and Force Gender Advisors are even more constrained. UNMISS, for example, has only three personnel focused on protection of women, and no Mission has more than two military officers working full time on gender. In these contexts, Protection of Civilians Advisors can sometimes provide support to backstop the training efforts of gender specialists. For example, in MONUSCO, Protection of Civilians advisors are collaborating with Force Gender Advisors and Women Protection Advisors to roll out new gender-sensitive risk assessment tools through mobile training visits to field offices. However, POC posts in missions are sometimes even fewer in number than gender specialist posts.

For a number of years, peacekeeping missions have been under pressure not to increase their budgets, and some have faced sweeping budget reductions. However, until efforts are made to recruit staff who have gender expertise into a broader variety of positions or to reinforce pre-deployment training, the in-mission training that gender specialists provide to all staff during induction will remain vital. Peacekeeping missions should therefore request an adequate number of gender-specialist posts at levels of seniority that enable regular and more in-depth training on CRSV for all staff. Missions can also explore whether military and police staff can be temporarily seconded into their Gender and Human Rights sections and/or whether Gender Advisors can be embedded into other sections and components for limited periods of time. Member States should continue to approve funding for existing posts and additional posts requested by missions where there is a demonstrated need for this additional capacity. In some cases, Member States provide voluntary funding for additional gender-focused posts and second government employees to serve in these positions. While positions currently funded through regular budgets should not be replaced with voluntarily funded or filled posts, additional voluntary commitments from Member States could greatly reinforce the gender capacity and CRSV expertise of missions. Member State secondments could also include experts in other substantive areas—such as justice, rule of law, protection of civilians, SSR, and DDR—who also have broader gender expertise.

Staff interviewed by CIVIC also highlighted the potential for temporary positions or surge deployments from New York and Geneva to support UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA with additional gender expertise when needed—but only if experts are deployed for long enough to contribute substantially to activities, and only if they have specialized thematic or practical skills in areas where the Missions are weak. The UN Secretariat should consider such deployments if they can support them without significantly detracting from the ability of their UN headquarters offices to achieve priority objectives. Deployments could include civilian personnel as well as engagement by the UN OMA Gender Advisor to support training of Force and Sector Commanders.

Troop and police contributing countries should also more substantively include CRSV in pre-deployment training using UN training materials. Moreover, they should consider incorporating scenario-based training that will better prepare soldiers for responding to CRSV once deployed. The UN could consider including response to a CRSV incident in the task evaluation templates shared with TCCs for pre-deployment troop evaluation. Currently the UN Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM) only includes a generic scenario for assessing troop response to a POC incident. Once deployed, missions should assess troops on their knowledge of core, required UN concepts, including gender and CRSV. As outlined in the UNIBAM, these evaluations can be used for "UNHQ-level decision making as to the future participation of a TCC in UN missions."[272]



UN Photo/Isaac Billy

March 6, 2020. *In Pibor, South Sudan, a series of intercommunal attacks left more than 8,000 people displaced in March 2020 and resulted in many deaths, injuries, and abductions of women and children.*

IX. CONCLUSION

Over the twenty years that have passed since the first WPS resolution was adopted by the UNSC in 2000, UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA have made significant progress making their protection efforts more gender sensitive and improving how they protect women, men, girls, and boys from CRSV. Mission mandates more explicitly task peacekeepers with protecting civilians from CRSV, and peacekeepers are more regularly asked to report on their efforts to prevent and respond to sexual violence in the countries where they are deployed.

Mandates, guidelines, and reporting requirements have begun to shift the internal processes of UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA so that they are better suited to understand the different protection threats facing women and men, and they are more likely to identify and address CRSV. These Missions are engaging more women in early warning forums, and they routinely engage women-led and focused civil society organizations. They are also reporting sex-disaggregated data more often, and the incident-tracking databases they use can enable peacekeepers to analyze trends in sexual violence. Gender and CRSV specialists in these peacekeeping Missions, including SWPAs, Gender Advisors, gender focal points, and Force Gender Advisors, are helping ensure that data is translated into more gender-sensitive activities and that CRSV is considered during planning and patrolling. Buy-in and prioritization is growing among senior Mission leadership in South Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR.

Despite this progress, incorporating gender into conflict analysis is still too often viewed as a burden and an extra step for peacekeepers trying to protect civilians rather than being viewed as a core piece of their protection efforts. Capacity-strapped missions still frequently assume that if they are protecting civilians from other threats, they will adequately address CRSV. Moreover, while efforts to promote gender parity and reduce SEA are important in their own right and have the potential to ensure peacekeepers are better equipped to recognize and prevent CRSV, these issues also have the potential to overshadow or obscure efforts by peacekeeping missions to ensure that their operations are more gender sensitive and that peacekeepers are able to protect civilians from gendered threats like CRSV. Training for uniformed and civilian personnel on CRSV and gender-sensitive conflict analysis needs to keep pace with training and awareness initiatives on SEA, and gender parity should be viewed as a component of more gender-sensitive operations rather than being seen as an end goal in itself. Likewise, initiatives like FETs and mixed engagement teams will not be effective unless they are used strategically to implement mandated tasks, including monitoring for and responding to CRSV threats.

The UN Secretariat and the senior leadership of UNMISS, MONUSCO, and MINUSCA need to strengthen awareness of new and existing guidelines on CRSV for staff at the global and Mission levels. Efforts to strengthen Mission monitoring and reporting—like the reinforcement of MARA Task Forces and the adoption of 15 core WPS indicators—are essential to improved protection of civilians from CRSV. Having gender and CRSV specialists in the Missions is also invaluable and will remain vital until the UN is able to ensure that all personnel deployed to peacekeeping missions have a better understanding of gender and CRSV. Member States should continue to prioritize funding for these positions as well as voluntary contributions and the secondment of civilian, military, and police officials directly to peacekeeping missions.

ENDNOTES

1 In French, this unit is called the Unité mixte d'intervention rapide et de répression des violences sexuelles faites aux femmes et aux enfants. In English, CIVIC found multiple translations in different UN and NGO documents, including the Joint Unit for Rapid Intervention and Eradication of Sexual Violence against Women and Children and the Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Suppression of Sexual Violence against Women and Children.

2 For example, the Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations has been endorsed by over 150 Member States. It includes a commitment to "implement the Women, Peace and Security agenda and its priorities by ensuring full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all stages of the peace process and by systematically integrating a gender perspective into all stages of analysis, planning, implementation and reporting." It continues, "We further recommit to increasing the number of civilian and uniformed women in peacekeeping at all levels and in key positions." Canada has also launched the Elsie Initiative to increase the meaningful participation of women in UN peace operations.

3 Throughout this report, CIVIC capitalizes the word "Mission" when referring to one or all three of these specific peacekeeping operations. When referring more generally to peacekeeping operations, the lowercase form of "missions" is used.

4 Note that the military, police, and civilian entities of a peacekeeping mission are generally referred to as three different components. These components are then further subdivided into sections and units. In larger, multidimensional peacekeeping missions, Force Commanders lead the mission's military component and report directly to the mission's civilian head: the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). These peacekeeping missions also usually divide up their mandated areas of operation into geographic sectors. All battalions and units operating in the same sector are overseen by a Sector Commander who reports to the Force Commander.

5 Gender specialists include Gender Advisors and gender focal points. Women Protection Advisors and Senior Women Protection Advisors are missions' CRSV specialists. The role of Force Gender Advisors and uniformed gender focal points spans gender and CRSV-related tasks. For a detailed description of these gender and CRSV specialists, see Textbox E.

6 The 15 core WPS indicators were established through Code Cable 1597 (2018). They do not focus specifically on CRSV, but two of the indicators track SGBV incidents while others track things like the gender sensitivity of conflict analysis and operations, which can contribute to improved response to CRSV.

7 UNSC Resolution 1820 (2008), Operative Paragraph (OP) 6.

8 Ibid, OP8.

9 UNSC Resolution 1888 (2009), OP11.

10 Ibid, OP12.

11 UNSC Resolution 1960 (2010), OP10, OP8.

12 UNSC Resolution 2106 (2013), OP5.

13 UNSC Resolution 2242 (2015), OP7.

14 The definition of CRSV is taken from the Handbook for United Nations Field Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence. Definitions for gender and SGBV are taken from the UN OHCHR Guidance and Practice note on Integrating a Gender Perspective into Human Rights Investigations. The definition for gender analysis is taken from the UN DPO Resource Package on Gender Equality, Women, Peace, and Security. CIVIC has adapted some of these definitions by shortening them to exclude examples and other clarifying sentences included at the end of some definitions.

15 UN DPO, *The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping: Handbook* (2020), 110.

16 Shannon Kirschner and Adam Miller, "Does Peacekeeping Really Bring Peace?: Peacekeeping and Combat-perpetrated Sexual Violence in Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 9 (2019). Note: peacekeeping missions are considered multidimensional because they include deployments of military, police, and civilian personnel working together to address insecurity and protection threats.

17 Karin Johansson and Lisa Hultman, "UN Peacekeeping and Protection from Sexual Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 63, no. 7 (2019).

18 NGO Working Group on Women, Peace, and Security, *Mapping Women, Peace, and Security in the Security Council: 2018* (November 2019), 1.

19 Ibid., 32.

20 Ibid., 8.

21 UN Women, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, 2015.

22 OIOS Internal Audit Division, *Audit of Gender Mainstreaming and Responsiveness in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo*, March 19, 2019; OIOS Internal *Audit Division, Audit of Gender Mainstreaming and Responsiveness in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic*, June 17, 2019; OIOS Internal *Audit Division, Audit of Gender Mainstreaming and Responsiveness in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan*, June 21, 2019.

23 The cluster system was introduced as part of a 2005 Humanitarian Reform Agenda. The goal of the system is to prevent gaps and overlap in the work of humanitarian and development actors by creating categories of humanitarian response—referred to as clusters and sub-clusters. Under the system, humanitarian and development actors working in the same field or cluster meet regularly to coordinate their activities. Each cluster and sub-cluster is led by two co-chairs who help to organize the meetings and lead on coordination. One of the co-chairs is usually a representative of a UN agency while the other represents a non-governmental organization. Additional information about the cluster approach is available online, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach.

24 Global Women's Institute of the George Washington University, International Rescue Committee, CARE International UK, and Forcier Consulting, *No Safe Place: A Lifetime of Violence for Conflict-Affected Women and Girls in South Sudan* (2017), 27–28.

25 Médecins Sans Frontières, *Nowhere to Go: Challenges Faced by Sexual Violence Survivors in Accessing Services in Bangui, Central African Republic*, November 2019. Note: the Gender-Based Violence Information Management System tracks six different types of SGBV, two of which are considered forms of CRSV.

26 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #22, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #184, Kalemie, October

2019; CIVIC interview with civilian, #28, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #40, Yei, December 2019.

27 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #18, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #22, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #46, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #5, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #15, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #38, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #40, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #53, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #54, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #60, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #181, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #190, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #35, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020. See also, Refugees International, *Still in Danger: Women and Girls Face Sexual Violence in South Sudan Despite Peace Deal*, October 2019.

28 UNMISS/UN OHCHR, *Access to Health for Survivors of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in South Sudan*, May 2020.

29 See Elizabeth Jean Wood, "Variations in Sexual Violence during War," *Politics and Society* 34 no. 3 (2006); Dara Kay Cohen, "Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross National Evidence (1980-2009)," *American Political Science Review* 107 no. 3 (August 2013).

30 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020.

31 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #39, remote call from Washington, DC, to Kinshasa, April 2020.

32 For analysis on this issue, see, for example, Nina Wilén, "What's the 'Added Value' of Male Peacekeepers? (Or—Why We Should Stop Instrumentalising Female Peacekeepers' Participation," *Africa Policy Brief* 29 (February 2020); Georgina Holmes, "Female Military Peacekeepers Left Feeling Overwhelmed After Inadequate Training," *The Conversation*, May 29, 2019, https://theconversation.com/female-military-peacekeepers-left-feeling-overwhelmed-after-inadequate-training-114887; Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, *Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping: Women, Peace, and Security in Post-Conflict States*, Oxford University Press, 2017.

33 UN DPO/DFS, *Civil Affairs Handbook* (2012), 22.

34 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #36, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #39, remote call from Washington, DC, to Kinshasa, April 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #4, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #10, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #12, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #20, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #29, Yei, February 2020.

35 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #205, Kalemie, October 2019.

36 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #26, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #35, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #36, Bangui, February 2020.

37 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #1, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #2, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #10, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #12, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #25, Yei, February 2020.

38 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #26, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #36, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #36, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #39, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #9, Juba, December 2019.

39 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Kinshasa, March 2020.

40 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #39, Bangui, February 2020.

41 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #31, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #44, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019. See also, CIVIC, *"Let Us Be a Part of It:" Community Engagement by the UN Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan*, 2017; UN, "System-Wide Strategy on Gender Parity," October 2017, 14–15.

42 Viola Guiliano, "The UN Peacekeeping Mission in CAR Strengthens Community Engagement in Order to Better Protect Civilians from Ongoing Violence," CIVIC Blog, August 4, 2020, https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/minusca-strengthens-community-engagement/.

43 See also: MONUSCO, *CLA Best Practice Review* (2014), 13–14.

44 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #31, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #44, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC written correspondence with Mission official, #94, Bouar, August 2020.

45 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #31, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #44, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #4, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #7, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Kinshasa, March 2020.

46 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #4, Kinshasa, February 2019.

47 UNMISS Civil Affairs Division Gender Mainstreaming Guidance Note, on file with CIVIC.

48 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #213, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #52, Juba, December 2019.

49 "MINUSCA's Female Engagement Team," YouTube video, 11:08, posted by MINUSCA, November 26, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QOYcN60OR68.

50 UN, "Infantry Battalion Manual," January 2020. The Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy of the UN for 2018 to 2028 also notes that requests for troops from troop contributing countries will now include a requirement that they provide Engagement Teams composed of at least 50 percent women.

51 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #59, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #57, Juba, December 2019.

52 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019.

53 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #42, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #59,

Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #212, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

54 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #41, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington DC to Goma, March 2020.

55 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #59, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #57, Juba, December 2019.

56 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019.

57 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #213, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

58 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020.

59 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #57, Juba, December 2019.

60 Research by other organizations has led to similar conclusions. See, for example, International Peace Institute, *Uniformed Women in Peace Operations: Challenging Assumptions and Transforming Approache*s, June 2020.

61 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #59, Goma, February 2019.

62 CIVIC interview with government official, #50, Bangassou, March 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #167, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #168, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #169, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #12, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #31, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with government official, #23, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #6, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #14, Yei, February 2020.

63 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #52, Bangassou, March 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #167, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #168, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #169, Kalemie, October 2019.

64 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #167, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #168, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #169, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #184, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #185, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #186, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #187, Kalemie, October 2019.

65 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #49, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #55, Bangassou, March 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #78, Kaga-Bandoro, March 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #13, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civilian, #28, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #63, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #3, Yei, February 2020.

66 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #29, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #31, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, Bangui, February 2020.

67 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #39, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with government official, #72, Bangui, April 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, Kaga-Bandoro, #90, March 2020. While somewhat unique to UNMISS, UNPOL officers inside protection of civilians (POC) sites on UN bases in South Sudan are usually the primary interlocutor for POC site residents, and POC site leaders report CRSV and SGBV to UNPOL officers, including specialized officers designated to receive information about these issues. For more information about their role, see CIVIC, *"Let Us Be a Part of It:" Community Engagement by the UN Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan.*

68 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #44, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #75, Bangui, April 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #205, Kalemie, October 2019.

69 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #26, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #88, Kaga-Bandoro, March 2020. See also, CIVIC's report, *"Let Us Be a Part of It:" Community Engagement by the UN Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan.*

70 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #28, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #9, Yei, February 2020.

71 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #44, Bangui, February 2020.

72 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #51, Bangassou, March 2020.

73 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #130, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #131, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #205, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #30, Yei, December 2019.

74 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #51, Bangassou, March 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #137, Kinshasa, October 2019.

75 Heads of Field Offices (HOFOs)—sometimes referred to just as Heads of Offices (HoOs)—are the highest-ranking civilian peacekeeping officials in field locations. They oversee the work of all civilian sections of a mission deployed in the same field location, although civilian personnel in field locations usually have dual reporting lines (one to the HOFO/HoO, and one to the overall head of their section in headquarters).

76 See, for example, Jamie J. Hagen, "Counting Male Victims, Recognizing Women Rapists and Revisting Assumptions about Conflict-Related Sexual Violence," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 13, no. 4 (2019); Chris Dolan, "Into the Mainstream: Addressing Sexual Violence against Men and Boys in Conflict," ODI briefing paper, May 2014.

77 UN DPO, *Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence*, May 1, 2019; UN, *Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook*, May 2019. Note, CIVIC is adopting the terminology of IRs from the Policy on Peacekeeping-Intelligence and the terminology of CCIRs from the Military-Peacekeeping-Intelligence Handbook. However, this terminology is not consistent across all UN policy and guidance documents and alternative terms are sometimes used in missions to indicate the same concepts.

78 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #164, Goma, October 2019.

79 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #43, Bangui,

February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #52, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #57, Juba, December 2019.

80 Excerpt of Force Operations Order, shared with CIVIC via written communication, December 2019.

81 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #52, Juba, December 2019.

82 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #28, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #41, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #42, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #43, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #155, Goma, October, 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Juba, December 2019. These observations are in line with academic literature. See, for example: Stephen Moncrief, "Military Socialization, Disciplinary Culture, and Sexual Violence in UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Journal of Peace Research* 54 no. 5, 715–730; Amelia Hoover Green, "Command and (Maybe) Control: Military Institutions and Sexual Violence During Peacekeeping Operations," Peacekeeping Prevention: Strengthening Efforts to Preempt Conflict-related Sexual Violence, *International Peacekeeping*, July 2020.

83 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #41, Bangui, February 2020.

84 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #42, Bangui, February 2020.

85 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #43, Bangui, February 2020.

86 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #33, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #44, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #202, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Juba, December 2019.

87 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #37, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #42, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #43, Bangui, February 2020.

88 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #16, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #33, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, Bangui, February 2020.

89 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #130, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #213, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020.

90 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #130, Kinshasa, October 2019.

91 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

92 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019.

93 This principle is outlined in the *Policy and Handbook for United Nations Missions on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence* as well as many other foundational documents for UN and non-UN entities engaging survivors of SGBV.

94 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #22, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #35, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #46, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #48, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #4, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #5, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #40, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #53, Juba, December 2019.

95 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #39, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #5, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #15, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #30, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #40, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #61, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #142, Kinshasa, October 2019. Additional information about the cluster approach is available online, https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/about-clusters/what-is-the-cluster-approach.

96 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #30, Yei, December 2019.

97 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2019.

98 UN Resolution 1960 (OP8) "requests the Secretary General [sic] to establish monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence, including rape in situations of armed conflict and post conflict and other situations relevant to the implementation of resolution 1888 (2009), as appropriate, and taking into account the specificity of each country, that ensure a coherent and coordinated approach at the field-level, and encourages the Secretary-General to engage with United Nations actors, national institutions, civil society organizations, health-care service providers, and women's groups to enhance data collection and analysis of incidents, trends, and patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence to assist the Council's consideration of appropriate actions… ."

99 CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #24, Bangui, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #44, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #142, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

100 CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #24, Bangui, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2019; written correspondence with Mission official, Bouar, #96, October 2020.

101 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2019.

102 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #44, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #25, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian

official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

103 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #63, remote call from Washington, DC, to Kinshasa, April 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #142, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

104 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #142, Kinshasa, October 2019.

105 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

106 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #20, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #48, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with intergovernmental organization official, #18, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019.

107 UN, *Provisional Guidance Note: Intersections Between the Monitoring, Reporting, and Analysis Arrangements (MARA) and the Gender-Based Violence Information Management Systems (GBV IMS)*, 2016.

108 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, Bangui, #39, February 2020; CIVIC interview Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #53, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #54, Juba, December 2019.

109 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #22, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #46, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #30, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #41, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #53, Juba, December 2019.

110 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #15, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #18, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #19, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #35, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #36, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #46, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #62, remote call from Washington, DC, to Kinshasa, April 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #15, Juba, December 2019.

111 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #41, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #53, Juba, December 2019.

112 Note, this is a point of contention between some humanitarians and peacekeeping missions. Impartiality is one of the core principles of peacekeeping, and missions do not consider themselves parties to a conflict.

113 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #18, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #39, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019.

114 Each Mission included in this report has different policies and practices in place for early warning and response. This report does not provide detailed recommendations for how to adjust each of these systems due to the difficulty of including a separate analysis for each Mission. Moreover, CIVIC is currently conducting more in-depth research into early warning in peacekeeping missions that will be used to make detailed recommendations in future publications.

115 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #60, Juba, December 2019.

116 In some missions, SAGE is part of a larger suite of software called Unite Aware.

117 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #23, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #48, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #129, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #214, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Kinshasa, February 2020.

118 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #129, Kinshasa, October 2019.

119 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #23, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #129, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #156, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #214, Goma, October 2019.

120 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #131, Kinshasa, October 2019.

121 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #43, Bangui, February 2020.

122 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #43, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #48, Bangui, February 2020.

123 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #15, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #43, Bangui, February 2020.

124 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #19, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #30, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #52, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #61, Juba, December 2019.

125 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #60, Juba, December 2019.

126 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #52, Juba, December 2019.

127 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #16, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #41, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #43, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #46, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #52, Juba, December 2019.

128 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #21, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with UN official, #1, conducted remotely from Washington, DC, to New York, May 2020.

129 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #130, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #213, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; written communication with Mission civilian official, April 2020.

130 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019.

131 CIVIC interview with diplomat, #141, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #216, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020.

132 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020.

133 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #16, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #52, Juba, December 2019.

134 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #52, Juba, December 2019.

135 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #33, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020.

136 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, Goma, February 2019.

137 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019.

138 While this report focuses primarily on identifying and assessing the work that peacekeeping missions do to support justice and accountability for CRSV, it should be acknowledged that other UN entities contribute to this work. For example, the United Nations Team of Experts on the Rule of Law and Sexual Violence in Conflict (ToE) created by UN Security Council Resolution 1888 (2009)—in coordination with UN peace operations and UNCTs—also supports building the capacity of national rule of law institutions to ensure accountability for CRSV. In 2019, the ToE, jointly with UN peace operations and other partners, supported the development of national accountability strategies, the strengthening of dedicated capacities, and the prosecution of cases of CRSV in the CAR, the DRC, and South Sudan, among other countries.

139 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #53, Bangassou, March 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #53, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #167, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #168, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #169, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with intergovernmental organization official, #18, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #3, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with government official, #5, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #6, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #8, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #16, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #27, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #29, Yei, February 2020.

140 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #2, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #7, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #12, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #13, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #15, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #28, Yei, February 2020.

141 CIVIC interview with civilian, #28, Yei, February 2020.

142 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #168, Kalemie, October 2019.

143 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #74, Masisi, May 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian actor, #53, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #1, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #4, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #19, Yei, February 2020.

144 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #12, Juba, December 2019.

145 CIVIC interview with government official, #50, Bangassou, March 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #75, Masisi, May 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #142, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #176, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #8, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #38, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #63, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #1, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #19, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #22, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #24, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #27, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #29, Yei, February 2020.

146 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #1, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #15, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #53, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #61, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #62, Juba, December 2019.

147 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #139, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #199, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #20, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #35, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; written communication with Mission official, July 2020.

148 Walter Lotze, "The Evolving United Nations Approach to Preventing and Addressing Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Experiences from the Democratic Republic of Congo," Peacekeeping Prevention: Strengthening Efforts to Preempt Conflict-related Sexual Violence, *International Peacekeeping* (July 2020), 24.

149 CIVIC interview with civilian, #49, Yei, December 2019.

150 CIVIC interview with government official, #5, Yei, February 2020.

151 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #8, Juba, December 2019.

152 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #55, Bangassou, March 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #75, Bangui, April 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #89, Kaga-Bandoro, March 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #92, Kaga-Bandoro,

March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #199, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #184, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #228, Kinshasa, November 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #232, Kinshasa, November 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #8, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #12, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with intergovernmental organization official, #18, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #28, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #31, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with government official, #32, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #3, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #4, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #7, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #25, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #27, Yei, February 2020.

153 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #75, Bangui, April 2020.

154 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #167, Kalemie, October 2019.

155 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #55, Bangassou, March 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #1, Yei, February 2020. This concern of civil society leaders was also recognized by peacekeepers and humanitarian actors who stressed that if men are not engaged in processes intended to empower women, they can undermine these efforts. CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #35, Bangui, February 2020.

156 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #55, Bangassou, March 2020.

157 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #22, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #29, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #30, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #39, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #42, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #44, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #86, Kaga-Bandoro, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #22, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #29, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview, #24, Yei, December 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #30, Yei, December 2019.

158 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #176, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #178, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with government official, #182, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

159 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #24, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #43,Bangui, February 2020.

160 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #31, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #33, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020.

161 CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #23, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #41, Bangui, February 2020; written communication with UN official, September 2020.

162 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #4, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #5, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #14, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #57, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #60, Juba, December 2019.

163 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #5, Juba, December 2019.

164 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #39, Bangui, February 2020.

165 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #89, Kaga-Bandoro, March 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #70, Masisi, May 2019; CIVIC interview with civilian, #87, Naybiondo, May 2019; CIVIC interview with civilian, #89, Naybiondo, May 2019; CIVIC interview with civilian, #95, Masisi, May 2019; CIVIC interview with civilian, #111, Masisi, May 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #2, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #3, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with government official, #5, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #6, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #10, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #12, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #13, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #15, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #17, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #18, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #20, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #21, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #22, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #27, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #29, Yei, February 2020; CIVIC interview with civilian, #30, Yei, February 2020.

166 For example, troops who are risk averse may opt not to exit their vehicles during patrols or might not carry out foot patrols in order to avoid potential harm to themselves. However, peacekeeping missions are limited in their ability to interact with civilians or identify, through observation, potential threats to civilians if they are in a quickly moving vehicle.

167 Written communication with Mission military official, #95, location in the CAR withheld, August 2020; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #13, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #34, Yei, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #63, Juba, December 2019. For similar analysis on the weaknesses of MONUSCO patrolling, see CIVIC, *Data-Driven Protection: Linking Threat Analysis to Planning in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (November 2019), 48.

168 CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #45, Yei, December 2019.

169 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #38, Yei, December 2019.

170 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019.

171 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

172 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #33, Bangui, February 2020.

173 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #19, Juba, December 2019.

174 At the time of CIVIC's research, UNMISS's JMAC section did not have a gender focal point in place, and neither did MINUSCA's Strategic Planning Unit (SPU). In both cases, these gaps were explained by staffing constraints. UNMISS's JMAC had recently undergone significant turnover in its staffing, and MINUSCA's SPU consists of only three people.

175 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #27, Bangui, February

2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #142, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #21, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #35, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #39, remote call from Washington, DC, to Kinshasa, April 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #51, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #56, Juba, December 2019.

176 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #48, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

177 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #26, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #39, remote call from Washington, DC, to Kinshasa, April 2020.

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183 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #24, location in the DRC withheld, March 2020.

184 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019.

185 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019.

186 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

187 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #41, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #42, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #43, Bangui, February 2020.

188 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #212, Goma, October 2019.

189 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #4, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #48, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with diplomat, #215, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #56, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #57, Juba, December 2019.

190 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #4, Kinshasa, February 2019.

191 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #57, Juba, December 2019.

192 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020.

193 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

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201 NAS, *Message to all Members Ref: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence*, October 16, 2019, https://www.nassouthsudan.com/download/20190810-message-to-all-members-ref-conflict-related-sexual-violence/.

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204 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019.
205 CIVIC, *Enabling Support by Mitigating Risk: MONUSCO's Implementation of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, June 2020.
206 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #41, Bangui, February 2020.
207 CIVIC, *Strengthened Planning in UN Peacekeeping Operations: How MINUSMA is Reinforcing its Strategic Planning Unit*, August 2019.
208 CIVIC, *Data-Driven Protection: Linking Threat Analysis to Planning in UN Peacekeeping Operations.*
209 In September 2020, CIVIC was informed via written communication with MONUSCO officials that action plans against CRSV had been completed and were being implemented in other locations. However, we were unable to confirm this information with multiple sources before the publication of this report.
210 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #1, Juba, December 2019.
211 CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #61, Juba, December 2019.
212 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #1, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #61, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #62, Juba, December 2019.
213 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Bangui, February 2020.
214 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #130, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020.
215 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #25, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, Goma, February 2019. See also, UN DPO/DPET/PBPS, *Thematic Paper: A Comprehensive and Sustainable Approach to Ending Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) by MONUSCO—Shabunda, South Kivu Province, DRC*, 2020.
216 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #130, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, Goma, February 2019.
217 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #63, remote call from Washington, DC, to Kinshasa, April 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #142, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, Goma, February 2019.
218 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #130, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020. See also, Fiston Mahamba and Hereward Holland, "Congo Court Hands Life Sentence to Warlord for Murder, Sexual Violence," Reuters, November 19, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-congo-justice/congo-court-hands-life-sentence-to-warlord-for-murder-sexual-violence-idUSKBN1XT2LQ.
219 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #24, location in the DRC withheld, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020. See also, UNSC, *2019 Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict Related Sexual Violence*, UN doc S/2020/487 (June 3, 2020), 11.
220 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019.
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222 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #17, Kinshasa, February 2019.
223 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #56, Juba, December 2019.
224 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020.
225 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #138, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #213, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #39, remote call from Washington, DC, to Kinshasa, April 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #59, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #62, Juba, December 2019.
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228 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, Bangui, February 2020.
229 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #138, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #213, Goma, October 2019.
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232 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #25, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #61, Juba, December 2019.
233 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020.
234 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #57, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Juba, December 2019; written communication with Mission official, on file with CIVIC, December 2019.
235 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #212, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.
236 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #155, Goma, October

2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #214, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #35, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #36, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020.

237 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #29, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #30, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #33, Bangui, February 2020.

238 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, Kinshasa, #126, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #213, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.

239 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #23, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #41, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #29, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #4, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with civil society leader, #9, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #42, Yei, December 2019.

240 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #39, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #128, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #156, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #213, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #216, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #247, location in the DRC withheld, November 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #52, Juba, December 2019.

241 CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #22, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #36, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #45, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #46, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #198, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #228, Kalemie, November 2019; CIVIC interview with diplomat, #59, Juba, December 2019.

242 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #16, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #29, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #35, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #41, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #42, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission police official, #13, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #127, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #130, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #131, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #142, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #20, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #21, Kinshasa, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #25, Yei, December 2019.

243 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #25, Yei, December 2019.

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245 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #31, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with diplomat, #141, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #35, remote call from New York to Kinshasa, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #1, Juba, December 2019.

246 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #57, Juba, December 2019.

247 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #37, Bangui, February 2020.

248 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #9, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #216, Goma, October 2019.

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250 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #4, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #47, remote call from Goma to Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #130, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #32, Kinshasa, March 2020.

251 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #35, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #174, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #34, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #52, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #60, Juba, December 2019.

252 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with diplomat, #211, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.
253 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019.
254 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #156, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #205, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #247, location in the DRC withheld, November 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Kinshasa, February 2020.
255 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020.
256 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #33, remote call from Washington, DC, to Goma, March 2020.
257 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #30, Bangui, February 2020.
258 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #31, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #44, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #139, Kinshasa, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #208, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #213, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #20, Juba, December 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #25, Yei, December 2019.
259 UNSC Resolution 2459 (2019), para 38. This reporting requirement was maintained in the Mission's 2020 mandate: UNSC Resolution 2514 (2020), para 41.
260 UNSC Resolution 2463 (2019), para 46(ii).
261 UN DPO, *Gender Equality and Women, Peace, and Security Resource Package* (2020), 165.
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263 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #4, Kinshasa, February 2019.
264 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #156, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #56, Juba, December 2020; CIVIC interview with UN official, #1, conducted remotely from Washington, DC, to New York, May 2020.
265 For example, section 5.2 of the UN Infantry Battalion Manual states that "TCCs should train for the full spectrum of tasks required by the mission mandate, including non-conventional tasks that may be unfamiliar to personnel. These training tasks should include POC challenges, Human Rights violations, situations involving CRSV, and convoy escorts. The mission should be contacted for advice on the development of appropriate exercise scenarios."
266 OIOS Internal *Audit Division, Audit of Gender Mainstreaming and Responsiveness in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan*.
267 OIOS Internal *Audit Division, Audit of Gender Mainstreaming and Responsiveness in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo*; OIOS Internal *Audit Division, Audit of Gender Mainstreaming and Responsiveness in the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic*.
268 CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #17, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with humanitarian official, #22, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #40, Bangui, February 2020; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #3, Kinshasa, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #38, Goma, February 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #156, Goma, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #201, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #205, Kalemie, October 2019; CIVIC interview with Mission civilian official, #50, Juba, December 2019.
269 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #21, Bangui, February 2020.
270 CIVIC interview with Mission military official, #37, Bangui, February 2020.
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272 UNIBAM, 83.

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