Disinformation and Civilian Protection

Deception and propaganda have long been features of warfare, and neither is prohibited under international humanitarian law. But the widespread availability of the internet and the growth in use of social media have changed the speed with which false information can be spread and the audience it can reach. Disinformation–the intentional dissemination of inaccurate or misleading information—and information operations—the dissemination of propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an adversary—are a central feature of some military strategies in the 21st century. Often the primary target of these operations is civilians rather than military opponents.  

These dynamics have created growing protection risks for civilians. Disinformation and hate speech can undermine social cohesion between communities and incite violence between them. Such disinformation campaigns have often targeted particularly vulnerable groups, including ethnic minorities, the LGBTQIA+ community, and women who challenge patriarchal institutions by running for political office or leading civil society organizations. Likewise, disinformation about the availability and locations of life-saving assistance or the protection actors who provide it, can make it more difficult and costly for humanitarian organizations to deliver services, disrupt civilian access to them, and ultimately undermine the physical well-being of people living in conflict-affected areas. It can also negatively affect the mental health of civilians who are already exposed to a variety of other traumatic experiences during war. 

The pathways between disinformation and civilian harm are not always direct or easy to untangle. Whether disinformation results in harm to civilians depends, among other factors, on the tactics used by armed actors, the media literacy of targeted civilians, the preparedness of militaries, humanitarians, and other protection actors to identify and counter disinformation, and the measures social media and technology companies take to limit the spread of disinformation on their platforms. 

It can be difficult to identify the perpetrators who spread harmful disinformation online, and there is little precedent for what accountability should look like for the individuals and institutions that create it, as well as those who knowingly spread false information and the platforms that fail to curb it. 

These factors can complicate policy responses to online disinformation—but the problem is only expanding. Global users of Facebook, grew from 100 million to 2.26 billion between 2008 and 2018. According to the Pew Research Center, five percent of US adults were using social media in 2005 as compared to 72 percent in 2021. In Ukraine, where disinformation has been a prominent aspect of the conflict, more and more civilians have turned to social media as their primary source of news. In recent years, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and United Nations officials have credited disinformation and hate speech with exacerbating violence in countries as disparate as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, and Myanmar. Disinformation campaigns have also increasingly been used to undermine the political and protection work of United Nations peace operations.

Through research and policy engagement on these issues, CIVIC aims to contribute to a clearer understanding of how and when disinformation erodes protection of civilians and identify lessons learned in how parties to a conflict and protection actors can limit the negative impact of disinformation on civilian well-being. At a minimum, militaries and intergovernmental organizations should go beyond tracking how information operations affect their own operations and ensure they pay better attention to the ways that these operations affect civilians during war. Better awareness can be a foundation for efforts to minimize and counter the negative impact of disinformation on civilians.

 

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